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Abstract
We consider a dynamic multifactor model of investment with ﬁnancing imperfections,
adjustment costs and ﬁxed and variable capital. We use the model to derive a test of
ﬁnancing constraints based on a reduced form variable capital equation. Simulation results
show that this test correctly identiﬁes ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms even when the estimation
of ﬁrms’ investment opportunities is very noisy. In addition, the test is well speciﬁed in
the presence of both concave and convex adjustment costs of ﬁxed capital. We conﬁrm
empirically the validity of this test on a sample of small Italian manufacturing companies.
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1I Introduction
In order to explain the aggregate behavior of investment and production, it is necessary to
understand the factors that aﬀect investment at ﬁrm level. Financing imperfections may prevent
ﬁrms from accessing external ﬁnance and make them unable to invest unless internal ﬁnance is
available. It is therefore important to study the extent to which ﬁnancing constraints matter
for ﬁrms’ investment decisions. This line of inquiry is also relevant for other areas of research,
such as the literature on the role of internal capital markets and banks, as well as the macro
literature on the ﬁnancial accelerator.
Starting with Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), several studies investigate the presence
of ﬁnancing constraints by estimating the Q model of investment with cash ﬂow included as an
explanatory variable.1 They argue informally that under certain conditions, and in the absence
of ﬁnancing frictions, Tobin’s average Q is equal to marginal q, and is a suﬃcient statistic for
ﬁrm investment (Hayashi, 1982). It follows that, conditional on Q, cash ﬂow should aﬀect only
the investment of ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.
The motivation for this paper is that recent studies, starting with Kaplan and Zingales (1997
and 2000), have shown that the correlation between ﬁxed investment and cash ﬂow is not a good
indicator of the intensity of ﬁrm ﬁnancing constraints. In particular Erickson and Whited (2000)
and Bond et al (2004) show that errors in measuring the expected proﬁtability of ﬁrms explain
most of the observed positive correlation between ﬁxed investment and cash ﬂow. Moreover,
Gomes (2001), Pratap (2003) and Moyen (2004) simulate industries with heterogeneous ﬁrms
who may face ﬁnancing frictions. They show that the correlation between ﬁxed investment
and cash ﬂow may be positive for ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms, and even larger than that of
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.2 Finally, Caballero and Leahy (1996) show that the failure of the
investment - cash ﬂow correlation as a measure of ﬁnancing constraints may be caused not only
by the measurement error in Q, but also by misspeciﬁcation and omitted variable problems.
The objective of this paper is to develop a new ﬁnancing constraints test that is robust to
1See Hubbard (1998) for a review of this literature.
2Alti (2003) and Abel and Eberly (2003) and (2004) develop theoretical frameworks in which positive
investment-cash ﬂow correlations arise in the absence of ﬁnancial markets imperfections.
2these problems and has the following properties: i) it is able to detect both the presence and
the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints on ﬁrm investment; ii) it is eﬃcient even in the presence of
large errors in the measurement of the productivity shock; iii) it is well speciﬁed under a wide
range of assumptions concerning the adjustment costs of ﬁxed capital.
The test is derived from a structural model of a risk-neutral ﬁrm that generates output using
two complementary factors of production, ﬁxed and variable capital. Fixed capital is irreversible,
while variable capital can be adjusted without frictions. Because of an enforceability problem,
the ﬁr mc a no b t a i ne x t e r n a lﬁnancing only if it secures it with collateral. The assets of the ﬁrm
can only be partially collateralizable and some down payment is needed to ﬁnance investment.
We describe the optimality conditions of the model and we demonstrate that under the
hypothesis of ﬁnancing imperfections, the correlation between ﬁnancial wealth and variable
capital investment is a reliable indicator of the presence of ﬁnancing constraints. We use this
result to develop a formal ﬁnancing constraint test based on a reduced form variable investment
equation. This new test has two main advantages with respect to the previous literature. First,
variable investment is less inﬂuenced by adjustment costs than ﬁxed investment. This property
reduces misspeciﬁcation and omitted variable problems in the investment equation, thereby
making it easier to distinguish the contribution of ﬁnancial factors from the contribution of
productivity shocks to ﬁrms’ investment decisions. Second, while ﬁxed investment decisions are
forward looking, variable investment decisions are mostly aﬀected by the current productivity
shock, which is relatively easy to estimate even if only balance sheet data are available. Therefore
our ﬁnancing constraints test does not require the estimation of Tobin’s Q, and it can be applied
also to small privately owned ﬁrms not quoted on the stock markets. This property of the test
is important. The previous investment literature has mainly studied the ﬁnancing constraints
of large ﬁrms quoted on the stock markets, even tough ﬁnancing frictions are mostly relevant
for the ﬁnancing of small privately owned ﬁrms.3 One reason for this bias is that the previous
3Among the exceptions, Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Whited (2006) consider data sets of publicly
owned ﬁrms focusing explicitly on small and very small ﬁrms. Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (1996), Gelos
and Werner (2002) and L´ izal and Svejnar (2002) study samples of small privately owned ﬁrms in developing
countries. However the claim that small ﬁrms do not matter for developed economies, because large ﬁrms account
for most of the aggregate employment and output, is not correct. For example, in 1995, small ﬁr m sw i t hl e s st h a n
100 employees accounted for 37.9% of the total employment in the US economy (source: US Census).
3literature focuses mostly on the Qmodel, where average Q is computed as the ratio of the market
value of the ﬁrm / the replacement value of its assets. However, because the market value is
easily measurable only for publicly traded ﬁrms, this approach precludes the analysis of the
eﬀects of ﬁnancing constraints on privately owned ﬁrms.4
We study the properties of the new ﬁnancing constraints test by solving the model and
simulating several industries with heterogenous ﬁrms. We show that the sensitivity of variable
capital to ﬁnancial wealth is able to detect both the presence and the intensity of ﬁnancing
constraints on ﬁrm investment. This result is robust to both concave and convex adjustment
costs of ﬁxed capital. More importantly, large observational errors in measuring the productivity
shock do not aﬀect the power of the test, because the ﬁnancial wealth of the simulated ﬁrms has
a very low correlation with the current productivity shock.
W ev e r i f yt h ev a l i d i t yo ft h i st e s to nt wo datasets of Italian manufacturing ﬁrms. These
datasets are very useful for the purpose of this paper for two reasons: i) almost all of the ﬁrms
considered are small and not quoted on the stock market; ii) all the ﬁrms are also covered by
in-depth surveys with qualitative information about the ﬁnancing problems the ﬁrms faced in
funding investment.
We estimate the variable investment equation on these datasets and we conﬁrm the pre-
dictions of the model. First, the estimated coeﬃcients do not reject the restrictions imposed
by the structural model. Second, the sensitivity of variable investment to internal ﬁnance is
signiﬁcantly positive for ﬁrms that are likely to face capital markets imperfections (according to
the qualitative survey) while it is always very small and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for
the other ﬁrms.
This paper contributes to both the theoretical and empirical literature on ﬁnancing con-
straints and ﬁrm investment. The simulation results of this paper are related to Gomes (2001),
Pratap (2003) and Moyen (2004). Because we consider both convex and non-convex adjustment
4One can in principle use other methods to calculate marginal q using only balance sheet data. For example
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) apply the VAR approach of Abel and Blanchard (1986) to a panel of ﬁrms.
But probably the resulting estimate of marginal q is even more noisy than the average Q calculated using the
stock market valuation of ﬁrms. Therefore the ﬁnancing constraints test based on this measure of marginal q is
probably even less reliable than the test based on average Q.
4costs, we are able to clarify the relationship between adjustment costs and the investment-
internal ﬁnance relationship. In our benchmark model, ﬁxed capital is irreversible and q is not
as u ﬃcient statistic for investment. In this case, the cash ﬂow - investment sensitivity is highest
for ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms, even in the absence of measurement errors in q, as is also
found by Moyen (2004). In the alternative model ﬁxed capital is subject to convex adjustment
costs and q is a suﬃcient statistic for investment. We show that in this case, the cash ﬂow
- investment sensitivity is a reliable indicator of ﬁnancing constraints, even in the presence of
large measurement errors in q.
Because of its emphasis on the importance of adjustment costs to understand the investment
decisions made by ﬁrms, this paper is related to Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) and to Abel
and Eberly (2002), who analyze the implications of diﬀerent types of adjustment costs on the
relationship between marginal Q and investment at the ﬁrm and at the aggregate level. Moreover
it is related to Whited (2006) who shows that, in the presence of ﬁxed costs of investment,
constrained ﬁrms are less likely to undertake a new, large investment project than unconstrained
ﬁrms, after controlling for expected productivity and for the time elapsed since the last large
investment project.
The empirical section of this paper uses a structural model of ﬁrm investment to derive a
ﬁnancing constraints test that is based on a simple reduced form linear investment equation.
A similar approach is followed by Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2006), who derive an enhanced
version of the Q model that allows for the presence of ﬁnancing frictions and debt overhang.
Carpenter and Petersen (2003) estimate a version of the Q model with cash-ﬂow where the
dependent variable is the growth of total assets of the ﬁrm rather than the ﬁxed investment
rate.
Our method to test for ﬁnancing constraints on ﬁrm investment can be applied using any
reversible factor of production. This paper considers the usage of variable inputs as the depen-
dent variable of the test. Therefore it is also related to Kashyap, Lamont and Stein (1994) and
Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen (1998). These authors show that inventories at ﬁrm level are
very sensitive to internal ﬁnance, especially for those ﬁrms a priori more likely to be ﬁnancially
5constrained. With respect to these authors, our paper, in addition to proposing a more rigorous
ﬁnancing constraints test that identiﬁes both the presence and the intensity of ﬁnancing con-
straints, has two further advantages. First, while the ﬂow of the usage of materials is very close
to a frictionless variable input, changes in total inventories are potentially subject to adjustment
costs of various nature, such as the presence of ﬁxed costs that imply (S,s) type of inventory
policies. Therefore the reduced form linear inventory models estimated by Kashyap, Lamont and
Stein (1994) and Carpenter, Fazzari and Petersen (1998) are potentially subject to misspeciﬁca-
tion problems, which make it diﬃcult to distinguish whether internal ﬁnance signiﬁcantly aﬀects
inventories because of ﬁnancing frictions or because it is capturing other omitted information.
Second, even if ﬁnancing constraints aﬀect inventory decisions, this does not necessarily imply
that they also aﬀect the investment in production inputs and the level of production of the ﬁrm.
Indeed the very fact that a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm can absorb a reduction in cash ﬂow with
a reduction in inventories means that it may be able to maintain the desired ﬂow of variable
inputs into the production process. Instead, the objective of this paper is precisely to estimate
the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints on the investment in variable inputs and on the production
of the ﬁrm.
This paper is organized as follows: section II describes the model. Section III deﬁnes the new
ﬁnancing constraints test. Section IV illustrates the simulation results. Section V veriﬁes the
validity of the new ﬁnancing constraints test using a balanced panel of Italian ﬁrms and ﬁnally,
section VI summarizes the conclusions.
II The model
The aim of this section is to develop a structural model of investment with ﬁnancing constraints
and with adjustment costs of ﬁxed capital. We consider a risk-neutral ﬁrm whose objective is
to maximize the discounted sum of future expected dividends. The discount factor is equal to
1/R, where R =1+r, and r is the lending/borrowing risk-free interest rate.
The ﬁrm operates with two inputs, kt and lt, ﬁxed and variable capital respectively. The





t with α + β < 1. (1)
All prices are constant and normalized to 1. This simplifying assumption will be relaxed
in the empirical section of the paper. θt is a productivity shock that follows a stationary
AR(1) stochastic process. For simplicity we assume that variable capital is nondurable and fully
depreciates after one period, while ﬁxed capital is durable:
0 < δ < 1, (2)
in which δ is the depreciation rate of ﬁxed capital. Moreover variable capital investment is not
subject to adjustment costs, while ﬁxed capital investment is irreversible:
it+1 ≥ 0, (3)
in which it+1 is gross ﬁxed investment:
it+1 ≡ kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt (4)
We assume full irreversibility for convenience, but the results of the paper would also hold
for other types of non-convex adjustment costs, such as partial irreversibility or ﬁxed costs.
Moreover in section IV we relax this assumption allowing also for convex adjustment costs.
Financial imperfections are introduced by assuming that new share issues and risky debt are
not available. At time t the ﬁrm can borrow from (and lend to) the banks one period debt, with
face value bt+1, at the market riskless interest rate r. A positive (negative) bt+1 indicates that
the ﬁrm is a net borrower (lender). Banks only lend secured debt, and the only collateral they
accept is physical capital. Therefore at time t the borrowing capacity of the ﬁrm is limited by
the following constraints:
bt+1 ≤ υkt+1 (5)
dt ≥ 0( 6 )
70 < υ ≤ 1 − δ
dt are dividends. υ is the share of ﬁxed capital that can be used as collateral. One possible
justiﬁcation for constraint (5) is that the ﬁrm can hide the revenues from production. Being
unable to observe such revenues, the banks can only claim the residual value of the ﬁrm’s physical
assets as repayment of the debt (Hart and Moore, 1998).5 If υ =1− δ then all the residual
value of ﬁxed capital is accepted as collateral. This is possible because we assume that the
irreversibility constraint (3) does not apply when the ﬁrm as a whole is liquidated and all its
assets are sold.6
The timing of the model is as follows: new capital purchased in period t − 1 generates
output in period t. At the beginning of period t the ﬁrm’s technology becomes useless with
an exogenous probability 1 − γ. In this case the assets of the ﬁrm are sold and the revenues
are distributed as dividends. Instead with probability γ the ﬁrm continues activity. Then θt is
realized, yt is produced using kt and lt, the production inputs purchased in the previous period,
and bt is repaid. The exogenous exit probability is necessary in order to generate simulated
industries in which a fraction of ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained in equilibrium. If γ =1a n d
ﬁrms live forever then they eventually accumulate enough wealth to become unconstrained, and
the simulated industry always converges to a stationary distribution of ﬁnancially unconstrained
ﬁrms, no matter how tight the ﬁnancing constraint (5) is.
It is useful to deﬁne the net worth of the ﬁrm wt, after the debt bt is repaid, as follows:
wt = wF
t +( 1− δ)kt (7)
Where wF
t is ﬁnancial wealth:
wF
t = yt − bt (8)
5Some authors argue that variable capital has a higher collateral value than ﬁxed capital (Berger et al, 1996).
Nevertheless the results derived in this section are consistent with alternative speciﬁcations that allow for a
positive collateral value of variable capital.
6In theory, the interactions between ﬁnancing constraints and adjustment costs of ﬁxed capital may imply
that in some cases the ﬁrm is forced to liquidate the activity to repay the debt, even if it would be proﬁtable to
continue. In order to simplify the analysis, we focus in this paper on the set of parameters that do not allow this
outcome to happen in equilibrium.
8After producing, the ﬁrm allocates wF
t plus the new borrowing between dividends, ﬁxed
capital investment and variable capital investment, according to the following budget constraint:
dt + lt+1 + it+1 = wF
t + bt+1/R (9)
For convenience, we deﬁne at as the stock of ﬁnancial savings:
at ≡− bt
We deﬁne a∗ as the minimum level of ﬁnancial savings such that the borrowing constraint
(5) is never binding for every period j ≥ t. The concavity of the production function (1) and
the stationarity of the productivity shock θ ensure that a∗ is positive and ﬁnite. Intuitively,




(lt+1 + it − yt). Because the discount factor of the ﬁrm is equal
to 1/R, when at <a ∗ the ﬁrm faces future expected ﬁnancing constraints and always prefers to
retain rather than to distribute earnings. Instead when at ≥ a∗ the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between
retaining and distributing net proﬁts. Therefore we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1: if at ≥ a∗ then the ﬁrm distributes net proﬁts as dividends:
dt = yt − lt+1 − it+1 + rat if at ≥ a∗
t (10)
Equation (10) implies that the ﬁrm distributes as dividends the extra savings above a∗.A s -
sumption 1 is only necessary to provide a natural upper bound to the value of wF
t , and it does
not aﬀect the real investment decisions of the ﬁrm.
L e t ’ sd e n o t et h ev a l u ea tt i m et of the ﬁrm, after θt is realized, by Vt (wt,θt,k t):





Et [Vt+1 (wt+1,θt+1,k t+1)] (11)
πt = γdt +( 1− γ)wt (12)
The ﬁrm maximizes (11) subject to equations (5), (6) and (9). Appendix 1 provides a proof
that the optimal policy functions kt+1 (wt,θt,k t),l t+1 (wt,θt,k t)a n dbt+1 (wt,θt,k t)e x i s ta n d
are unique.
9In order to describe the optimality conditions of the model, we use equation (9) to substitute
dt in the value function (11). Let µt, λt and φt be the Lagrangian multipliers associated respec-
tively with the irreversibility constraint (3), the borrowing constraint (5) and the non-negativity
constraint on dividends (6). The solution of the problem is deﬁned by the following conditions:
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kt+1 + lt+1 ≤ wF












































Equations (13), (14) and (15) are the ﬁrst order conditions of bt+1,l t+1 and kt+1 respectively.
Equation (16) combines the budget constraint (9) and the collateral constraint (5) and implies
that the down payment necessary to buy kt+1 and lt+1 must be lower than the residual net





Equation (20) implies that as long as there are some current or future expected ﬁnancing
constraints, then φt > 0a n dt h eﬁrm does not distribute dividends: dt = 0. Equation (14)
represents the optimality condition for the ﬁxed capital kt+1. The left-hand side is the marginal









− (1 − δ)
ª
is the shadow cost of buying one additional unit of ﬁxed capital





is equal to zero if the ﬁrm is not ﬁnancially
constrained today or in the future. The term µt measures the shadow cost of a currently binding










Therefore the more the ﬁrm expects to be ﬁnancially constrained in the future, the higher the
cost of future expected irreversibility constraints. Equation (15) is the optimality condition for





is directly related to λt, the Lagrange multiplier
of the borrowing constraint (5).
If constraint (16) is not binding then λt = 0. In this case equations (14) and (15) determine
the optimal unconstrained capital levels ku
t+1 and lu
t+1. If ku
t+1 is greater than (1 − δ)kt, then














than (1 − δ)kt then the irreversibility constraint is binding. kt+1 is constrained to be equal to
(1 − δ)kt, and equations (14) and (15) can be solved to determine lic
t+1 and µic
t . In this case












constraint is instead binding when ﬁnancial wealth is not suﬃcient as a down payment for k∗
t+1
and l∗








t+1 >w t +( 1− δ)kt (21)
In this case the constrained levels of capital kc
t+1 and lc








t+1 = wt +( 1− δ)kt (22)
and the solution is determined by the values kc
t+1,l c
t+1 , λt and µt that satisfy equations (3),
(14), (15) and (22).
III A new test of ﬁnancing constraints based on variable capital
One important property of variable capital is that equation (15) is not directly aﬀected by the
irreversibility constraint of ﬁxed capital. The ﬁnancing constraints test developed in this paper





, which summarizes the eﬀect of ﬁnancing
constraints on variable capital investment, is a monotonously decreasing and convex function of
wF
i,t, as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 We deﬁne wmax
t (θt,k t) as the level of ﬁnancial wealth such that the ﬁrm does
n o te x p e c tt ob eﬁnancially constrained now or in the future. It follows, for a given value of the
state variables θt and kt and for wF
t <w max





is positive and is decreasing and




































Proof: see appendix 2.
Proposition 1 applied to equation (15) establishes a link between ﬁnancing imperfections
and the real investment decisions of ﬁrms. It says that when a ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained
then the availability of internal ﬁnance increases the investment in variable capital and reduces
its marginal return. It is important to note that proposition 1 cannot be applied to ﬁxed
capital investment because of the presence of the irreversibility constraint. If the irreversibility
constraint is binding, then kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt and µt > 0. In this case a change in the intensity





in equation (14), aﬀects the value of
µt but does not aﬀect ﬁxed capital investment.
Therefore we propose a new ﬁnancing constraints test that applies proposition 1 to variable













































12in which η is an indicator of the intensity of the ﬁnancing constraints. The more the ﬁrm is
ﬁnancially constrained (in the model, this corresponds to a lower value of υ, which tightens






increases more rapidly as wF
t decreases) and the larger η is. wmax
t is
not observable in reality, but it is itself a function of the other state variables. Intuitively wmax
t
increases in Et (θi,t+1) because a higher productivity increases the ﬁnancing needs of the ﬁrm,
and conditional on Et (θi,t+1) it decreases in kt, because a higher existing stock of ﬁxed capital
implies that more ﬁnancial wealth can be used to ﬁnance variable capital. Since kt+1 is highly
correlated with kt, our simulations show that a good approximation of wmax
t is the following:
wmax
t = wmax [Et (θt+1)]
ζ kω
t+1 (25)
Using equations (24) and (25) in (23), and lagging equation (23) by one period, we obtain
the following reduced form variable capital equation:
lnlt = π0 + π1 lnEt−1 (θt)+π2 lnkt + π3 lnwF




















The term εt includes the approximation errors. When estimating equation (26) with the empir-
ical data it may also include measurement errors as well as unobservable productivity shocks.
Such problems are dealt with in the estimations in the empirical section of the paper.
The new ﬁnancing constraints test is based on the coeﬃcient π3. In the absence of ﬁnancing
frictions η is equal to zero. This implies that π3 =0 ,π1 = 1
1−β and π2 = α
1−β. Therefore π1
and π2 can be used to recover the structural elasticities α and β. In the presence of ﬁnancing
constraints η and π3 are instead positive. The intuition is the following: suppose a ﬁnancially
unconstrained ﬁrm receives a positive productivity shock at time t − 1, so that lnEt−1 (θt)i s
high. This ﬁrm increases lt up to the point that the marginal return on variable capital is equal
to its user cost. Alternatively a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm can only invest in variable capital
if it has ﬁnancial wealth available. For this ﬁrm lnlt is less sensitive to the productivity shock
lnEt−1 (θt)a n di sp o s i t i v e l ya ﬀected by the amount of ﬁnancial wealth lnwF
t−1. It is important to
note that the irreversibility of ﬁxed capital ampliﬁes the eﬀect of ﬁnancing frictions on variable
13capital, and it implies that variable investment may be signiﬁcantly ﬁnancially constrained
even after a negative shock, when θt−1 and Et−1 (θt) are low. The negative shock implies that
kt−1 is relatively high, and the ﬁrm would prefer to reduce it, but kt is constrained to be
not smaller than (1 − δ)kt−1. In this situation a ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrm would choose a
relatively high level of lt, because the two factors of productions are complementary. In contrast
a ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrm is forced to cut variable capital when it has not enough ﬁnancial
wealth available, and therefore the lower lnwF
t−1 is, the lower lnlt is.
This ﬁnancing constraints test has the following useful properties: i) it does not require the
estimation of marginal q, but only of the productivity shock θ. Unlike q,θ is not a forward looking
variable. Therefore any error in measuring the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm probably implies a smaller
measurement error in θ than in q. Moreover θ can be estimated from balance sheet data, and it
can be easily applied to datasets of small privately owned ﬁrms not quoted on the stock market.
ii) Although it is based on a simple reduced form investment equation, this test allows the
recovery of the structural parameters α and β. The estimates of α and β provide an additional
robustness check of the validity of the model. iii) Simulation results presented in the next section
show that equation (26) is also able to detect the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints when ﬁxed
capital is subject to convex adjustment costs rather than to the irreversibility constraint. The
intuition is that in both cases equation (26) is well speciﬁed, because the information concerning
the adjustment costs of ﬁxed capital is summarized by kt.
A Alternative testing strategy


















lt is an expectational error. By taking logs and rearranging, we obtain
the following:
















t enters nonlinearly in equation (29). If ε
y






























t, and obtain the
following:




In theory, equation (30) could be used for the purpose of estimating the intensity of ﬁnancing
constraints. However our simulations of the calibrated model indicate that ε
y
t is likely to be large
because its volatility is driven by the volatility of the idiosyncratic productivity shock. They also
show that the nonlinearity of ε
y
t in equation (29) may considerably reduce the precision of the
ﬁnancing constraints test based on equation (30), especially when the number of observations in
t h es a m p l ei ss m a l l .T h e r e f o r ei nt h ee m p i r i c a ls e c t i o no ft h i sp a p e rw ef o c u so nt h ee s t i m a t i o n
of equation (26).
IV Simulation results
In this section we use the solution of the model to simulate the activity of many ﬁrms. These
are ex ante identical and are subject to an idiosyncratic productivity shock that is uncorre-
lated across ﬁrms and autocorrelated for each ﬁrm. We simulate several industries in order to
verify whether equation (26) is able to detect the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints on ﬁrms
investment. We adopt the same methodology commonly used in empirical applications since
the seminal paper of Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988). We use a priori information to
select a subsample of ﬁrms more likely to face ﬁnancing imperfections, and then we compare
the sensitivity of investment to internal ﬁnance for this group with respect to the other ﬁrms.
All simulations assume that prices and interest rate are constant. As our objective is to analyze
the eﬀects of ﬁnancing constraints at ﬁrm level, the partial equilibrium nature of this exercise
does not restrict the analysis in any important way. In one set of simulated industries, ﬁrms
become ﬁnancially constrained when the borrowing constraint (5) is binding, and their internal
ﬁnance is not suﬃcient to ﬁnance all proﬁtable investment opportunities. In another set of in-
dustries, ﬁrms are not ﬁnancially constrained because υ is so high that the borrowing constraint
(5) is never binding with equality. We also make a further distinction. In one set of industries

































In the absence of ﬁnancing frictions both Φt−1 and φt−1 are equal to zero, and equation (32)










The idiosyncratic shock is modeled as follows (in the remainder of the paper we include the









with α + β < 1 (34)
θi,t is a persistent shock and θI
i,t is an i.i.d. shock:
lnθi,t = ρlnθi,t−1 + εi,t (35)















for all i (38)
The persistent shock θ is necessary to match the volatility and the persistence in ﬁrm invest-
ment. The i.i.d. shock θI matches the volatility of proﬁts and ensures that they are negative for
as i g n i ﬁcant share of ﬁrms in the simulated industry. Both shocks are important because they
16allow the simulated ﬁrms to have realistic dynamics of both investment and ﬁnancial wealth. If
we only allow for the persistent shock θ (by setting σ2
εI =0 ) , not only is the volatility of proﬁts
of simulated ﬁrms too low, but these also never have negative proﬁts, which instead are observed
for a large share of ﬁrm-year observations in the sample used for the empirical analysis in the
next section.
The dynamic investment problem is solved using a numerical method (see appendix 3 for
details). The model is parameterized assuming that the time period is one year. Table I
summarizes the choice of parameters. The risk-free real interest rate r is equal to 2%, which
is the average real return on a 1-year US T bill between 1986 and 2005. The sum of α and β
matches returns to scale equal to 0.97. This value is consistent with studies on disaggregated
data that ﬁnd returns to scale to be just below 1 (Burnside, 1996). Moreover, because in the
model there are no ﬁxed costs of production, even such a small deviation from constant returns
is suﬃcient to generate, for the set of benchmark parameters, average proﬁts in the simulated
ﬁrms that are relatively large and consistent with the empirical evidence. β is set to match the
ratio of ﬁxed capital over variable capital. In the model, variable capital fully depreciates in
one period, and therefore we consider as variable capital the sum of materials cost and wages,
and we consider as ﬁxed capital land, buildings, plant and equipment. Using yearly data about
manufacturing plants from the NBER-CES database (which includes information about the cost
of materials), we calculate a ﬁxed capital/variable capital ratio between 0.5 and 0.7 for the 1980-
1996 period. The other parameters are the following: the depreciation rate of ﬁxed capital δ is set
equal to 0.12; b,ρ and σε match the average, standard deviation, and autocorrelation of the ﬁxed
investment rate of the US Compustat database, as reported in Gomes (2001); σ2
εI matches the
standard deviation of the cash ﬂow/ﬁxed capital ratio; υ is set to match the average debt/assets
ratio of US corporations; γ is equal to 0.94, implying that in each period a ﬁrm exits with 6%
probability. This value is consistent with the empirical evidence about ﬁrms’ turnover in the US
(source: Statistics of U.S. Businesses, US Census Bureau). The second part of table I reports
the matched moments. The simulated industries do not match perfectly the empirical moments,
given the presence of nonlinearities in the mapping from the parameters to the moments, but
17they are suﬃciently close for our purpose.
We simulate 50000 ﬁrm-year observations, which can be interpreted as an industry where we
observe every ﬁrm in every period of activity, and where a ﬁrm that terminates its activity is
replaced by a newborn ﬁrm. The initial wealth of a newborn ﬁrm is equal to 40% of the average
ﬁxed and variable capital of a ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrm. This initial endowment ensures
that ﬁnancing constraints are binding for a non-negligible fraction of ﬁrms in the simulated
industries. The initial ﬁxed capital of a newborn ﬁrm is ex ante optimal, conditional on its
initial wealth and the expectation as regards the initial productivity shock. Tables II-V report
the estimation results from the simulated data. In these tables we do not report the standard
deviations of the estimated coeﬃcients, because all coeﬃcients are strongly signiﬁcant. Table
II reports the estimation results of equation (26). It shows that the new test is always able
to identify more ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms because the coeﬃcient of lnwF is positive in the
industries with ﬁnancing frictions and is otherwise equal to zero. In the bottom part of table
II we compare the groups of most constrained ﬁrms and the complementary samples (the test
statistic of the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients across groups is not reported because it is always
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero). We sort ﬁrms into groups of more ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms





where Ti is the number of years of operation of ﬁrm i. In the industries with ﬁnancing frictions,
the ﬁnancing constraint is not always binding. This is because ﬁrms accumulate wealth, and
become progressively less likely to face a binding ﬁnancing constraint. Therefore the higher λi
is, the higher the intensity of ﬁnancing problems for ﬁrm i.
The middle part of table II shows that the coeﬃcient of lnwF also identiﬁes the intensity of
ﬁnancing constraints because its magnitude increases with the magnitude of λi in each industry.
Intuitively, the higher the value of λi, the more ﬁrm i has observations with a binding ﬁnancing
constraint and the more variable capital is sensitive to ﬁnancial wealth.
Table II also shows that the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints, and hence also the sensitivity
18of variable capital to ﬁnancial wealth, is on average larger in the industry with the irreversibility
constraint than in the industry with convex adjustment costs. λ is higher in the former case
because the irreversibility of ﬁxed capital signiﬁcantly increases the impact of ﬁnancing frictions
on variable capital investment. This happens not only because variable capital is the only factor
of production that absorbs wealth ﬂuctuations when the irreversibility constraint is binding,
but also because when both constraints are binding a ﬁrm has too much ﬁxed capital and not
enough funds to invest in variable capital. The unbalanced use of the two factors of production
reduces revenues and ﬁnancial wealth and it increases the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints. On
the contrary, in the industry with quadratic adjustment costs, ﬁxed investment is allowed to be
negative and a ﬁrm can absorb a negative productivity shock by reducing both ﬁxed and variable
capital. The other estimated coeﬃcients are consistent with the predictions of the model. In the
industry without ﬁnancing frictions, the estimated coeﬃcients π1 and π2 are equal to 1
1−β and
α
1−β. In the industries with ﬁnancing frictions, π1 and π2 are also nonlinear functions of the
parameters ζ and ω.
The approximations in equations (24) and (25) imply that equation (26) is correctly spec-
iﬁed also in the presence of ﬁnancing frictions. Therefore it is important to verify that these
approximations are correct, and that they do not bias the estimated coeﬃcient of lnwF.F i r s t ,










t ). The estimation yields η =0 .024, with a very high good-
ness of ﬁt( R2 =0 .977). This relationship is also shown graphically in ﬁgure 1. Second, we
take the logs of equation (25) and we estimate it with OLS. The R2 of the regression is 0.91,
suggesting that the eﬀect of the omitted variable lnwmax
t in equation (26) should be absorbed
by lnEt−1 (θt)a n dl n kt, and should not bias signiﬁcantly the coeﬃcient of lnwF
t−1. We verify
this claim by estimating a version of equation (26) where lnwmax
t−1 is explicitly included as a
regressor. The bottom part of table II reports the estimation results, which are very similar to
those illustrated above, and conﬁrm that the coeﬃcient of lnwF
t−1 is a reliable indicator of the
intensity of ﬁnancing constraints.
So far we have estimated the variable capital equation under the assumption that all variables
19are perfectly observable. However in reality the productivity shock θt is estimated using balance
sheet data. Therefore table III reports the estimation results of equation (26) where lnEt−1 (θt)
is observed with noise:
lnEt−1 (θt)
∗ =l nEt−1 (θt)+κt−1
κt−1 is an i.i.d. error drawn from a normal di s t r i b u t i o nw i t hm e a n0a n dv a r i a n c eσ2
κ. The ﬁrst
column of table III replicates the results in the ﬁrst column of table II. The second and third
columns include a measurement error in lnEt−1 (θt), with a “noise-to-signal” ratio (the ratio
of σ2
κ to the variance of lnEt−1 (θt)) equal to 0.25 and 1 respectively. The next three columns
r e p e a tt h es a m ea n a l y s i sf o rt h ee c o n o m yw i t ht h ei r r e v e r s i b i l i t yc o n s t r a i n t .T h er e s u l t ss h o w
that measurement errors cause a negative bias in the coeﬃcient of lnwF
t−1. But because the bias
is small, this coeﬃcient is still a reliable indicator of the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints. It is
positive only for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, and a higher value of this coeﬃcient for a group
of ﬁrms always signals that this group is more ﬁnancially constrained than the complementary
sample. The only exception is in the third column: in this case when the measurement error
is very large and ﬁrms are not very constrained (in the economy with quadratic adjustment
costs λ is much smaller than 1% for all ﬁrms except the 20% most constrained ones), then
the coeﬃcient of lnwF
t−1 becomes negative, even though it is still increasing in the intensity of
ﬁnancing constraints.
The measurement error in the productivity shock has little eﬀect on the coeﬃcient of lnwF
t ,
because these two variables are nearly uncorrelated in the industries with ﬁnancing constraints
(see table II). This happens despite lagged cash ﬂow, which is one of the determinants of
ﬁnancial wealth, being positively correlated to the productivity shock. There are two reasons
for the low correlation between lnEt−1 (θt)a n dl nwF
t−1:i )ﬁrms that face ﬁnancing imperfections
accumulate ﬁnancial wealth. This means that wF
t−1 increases as the accumulated savings increase,
and it becomes less sensitive to current ﬂuctuations in cash ﬂow; ii) equation (7) shows that the
net worth of the ﬁrm is the sum of ﬁnancial wealth wF
t and the residual value of ﬁxed capital
(1 − δ)kt. Because the productivity shock is persistent, when θt−1 and Et−1 (θt) are low, it is
20also likely that θt−2 was low, so that the ﬁrm did not invest in ﬁxed capital in the past, and
a larger fraction of its wealth wt−1 was invested in ﬁnancial wealth wF
t−1. The same reasoning
applies when Et−1 (θt) is high. This “composition eﬀect” implies a negative correlation between
ﬁnancial wealth and the productivity shock, and it counterbalances the positive correlation eﬀect
induced by the cash ﬂow.
We have so far assumed that the residual value of capital is entirely collateralisable. In other
words, there is no discount in the liquidation value of the ﬁrm’s ﬁxed assets. This assumption
increases the leverage of the simulated ﬁrms and gets it closer to the empirical value. However,
in reality, distressed ﬁrms often sell capital at ﬁre-sale prices. Therefore in table IV we estimate
equation (26) for industries with diﬀerent values of υ.T h eﬁrst column replicates the results of
table II, with υ =1 −δ. The second and third columns consider υ =0 .85(1−δ)a n dυ =0 .7(1−δ)
respectively. They show that the lower the collateral value of capital, the higher the intensity
of ﬁnancing constraints and the coeﬃcient of lnwF
t−1.
Summing up, the simulation results illustrated in tables II-IV suggest that the coeﬃcient of
lnwF in equation (26) is a precise and reliable indicator of ﬁnancing constraints, even in the
presence of diﬀerent types of adjustment costs of ﬁxed capital and large observational errors in
the productivity shock.
In the remainder of this section we compare the performance of this new test with a test
based on the q model of ﬁxed capital:
ii,t
ki,t−1





Table V shows the estimation results of equation (40). In the σε
σq=.25 and σε
σq=1 columns
there is a measurement error in q, with a noise-to-signal ratio equal to 0.25 and 1 respectively.
In the ﬁrst half of table V, adjustment costs are quadratic. In the absence of ﬁnancing frictions,
the investment ratio
ii,t
ki,t−1 is determined by equation (33) and therefore qi,t−1 is a suﬃcient
statistic for
ii,t
ki,t−1. As a consequence, the coeﬃcient of
wF
i,t−1
ki,t−1 is equal to zero. I nt h ep r e s e n c eo f
ﬁnancing frictions the coeﬃcient of
wF
i,t−1
ki,t−1 is positive, signiﬁcant, and increasing in the intensity
of ﬁnancing constraints, even in the presence of measurement errors, because
ii,t
ki,t−1 is determined
21by equation (32), and
wF
i,t−1
ki,t−1 is negatively correlated with the omitted term 1 + φt−1. Therefore
the ﬁrst half of table V shows that when adjustment costs are convex, equation (40) does a
good job of identifying ﬁnancing constraints, even in the presence of measurement errors in q.
On the contrary, in the second part of table V we consider the industry with irreversibility of




is positive for unconstrained ﬁrms because ﬁnancial wealth conveys relevant information about
investment. Moreover the coeﬃcient of
wF
i,t−1
ki,t−1 is small for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms because
for them, most of the ﬂuctuations in wealth are absorbed by variable capital. As a consequence,
ﬁxed capital investment is more sensitive to ﬁnancial wealth for less constrained than for more
constrained ﬁrms for almost all of the sorting criteria. Thus equation (40) is not useful for
identifying ﬁnancing constraints, as is also found in Gomes (2001), Pratap (2003), Moyen (2004)
and Hennessy and Whited (2006).
A more direct comparison with the previous literature is provided at the bottom of table V,
w h e r ew eu s ea v e r a g eQ to replace the unobservable marginal q, a n dw eu s et h ec a s hﬂow ratio
CFi,t−1
ki,t−1 as the explanatory variable that captures ﬁnancing frictions. The results show that the
cash ﬂow coeﬃcient is highly signiﬁcant both in the constrained and unconstrained industries,
as also found by Moyen (2004). However such coeﬃcient is not a good indicator of the presence
of ﬁnancing constraints in the presence of ﬁxed capital irreversibility.
V Empirical evidence
In this section we verify empirically the validity of the new test of ﬁnancing constraints described
in the previous section on a sample of small and medium Italian manufacturing ﬁrms. The
sample is obtained by merging the two following datasets provided by Mediocredito Centrale: i)
a balanced panel of more than 5000 ﬁrms with company accounts data for the 1982-1991 period.7
This is a subset of the broader dataset of the Company Accounts Data Service, which is the
most reliable source of information on the balance sheet and income statements of Italian ﬁrms,
7The original sample had balance sheet data from 1982 to 1994, but we discarded the last three years of balance
sheet data (1992, 1993 and 1994) from the sample, because of discrepancies and discontinuities in some of the
balance sheet items, probably due to changes in accounting rules in Italy in 1992.
22and it has often been used in empirical studies on ﬁrm investment (e.g. Guiso and Parigi, 1999).
ii) The four Mediocredito Centrale Surveys on small and medium Italian manufacturing ﬁrms.
The surveys were conducted in 1992, 1995, 1998 and 2001. Each Survey covers the activity
of a sample of more than 4400 small and medium manufacturing ﬁrms in the three previous
years. The samples are selected balancing the criterion of randomness with that of continuity.
Each survey contain three consecutive years of data. After the third year, 2/3 of the sample is
replaced and the new sample is then kept for the three following years.
The information provided in the surveys includes detailed qualitative information on prop-
erty structure, employment, R&D and innovation, internationalization and ﬁnancial structure.
Among the ﬁnancial information, each Survey asks speciﬁc questions about ﬁnancing constraints.
In addition to this qualitative information, Mediocredito Centrale also provides, for most of the
ﬁrms in the sample, an unbalanced panel with some balance sheet data items going back as far
as 1989. Examples of published papers that use the Mediocredito Centrale surveys are Basile,
Giunta and Nugent (2003) and Piga (2002).
The main dataset used in this section is obtained by merging the ﬁrms in the balanced panel
of the Centrale dei Bilanci with the ﬁrms in the 1992 Mediocredito Survey. The merged sample
is composed of 812 ﬁrms, for which we have a unique combination of very detailed balance sheet
data and detailed qualitative information about ﬁnancing constraints. As a robustness check
in section VI,E we consider an alternative dataset based on the 1998 and 2001 surveys. This
dataset is larger but has less detailed balance sheet data and less precise information about
ﬁnancing constraints.
Regarding the main dataset, we eliminate ﬁrms without the detailed information concerning
the composition of ﬁxed assets (that do not distinguish between plant and equipment on the
one side and land and building on the other side), ending up with 561 ﬁrms. We further
eliminate ﬁrms that merged or ﬁrms that split during the sample period. The remaining sample
is composed of 415 ﬁrms, virtually none of which is quoted on the stock markets. The information
on ﬁnancing constraints is contained in the investment section of the 1992 Survey. This section
requests detailed information regarding the most recent investment projects aimed at improving
23the ﬁrm’s production capacity. The ﬁrm indicates both the size of the project and the years in
which such project was undertaken. 95% of all the answers concern projects undertaken between
1988 and 1991. Among the ﬁnancial information, the ﬁrm is asked whether it had diﬃculties in
ﬁnancing such project because of:
a) “lack of medium-long term ﬁnancing”; b) “high cost of banking debt”; c) “lack of guar-
antees”.
It is worthwhile to notice that the selection of the ﬁrms in this sample is biased towards
less ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, for at least two reasons: i) the balanced panel only includes
ﬁrms that have been continually in operation between 1982 and 1992, thus excluding new ﬁrms
and ﬁrms that ceased to exist during the same period because of ﬁnancial diﬃculties; ii) by
eliminating mergers we eliminate ﬁrms in proﬁtable businesses that merged with other companies
because of their ﬁnancing problems.








All variables are in real terms, and are the following: yi,t = total revenues (during period
t, ﬁrm i); ki,t−1 = replacement value of plant, equipment and intangible ﬁxed capital (end of
period t−1, ﬁrm i); li,t = cost of the usage of materials (during period t, ﬁrm i); ni,t = labor cost
(during period t, ﬁrm i). Detailed information about all the variables is reported in appendix 4.
With respect to equation (1) in the theoretical model, equation (41) includes labor as a factor
of production and it includes ﬁxed capital as lagged by one period. Therefore we assume that
ﬁxed capital installed in period t will become productive from period t + 1 on. Under these
assumptions the ﬁrst order condition for variable capital is still represented by equation (15).














Equation (42) implies that proposition 1 still holds, conditional also on nt. Moreover we can
rearrange equation (42) and lag it by one period to obtain the following reduced form variable
24capital equation:
lnli,t = π0 + ai + dt + π1 lnθi,t−1 + π2 lnki,t−1 + π3 lnni,t + π4 lnwF
i,t−1 + εi,t, (43)
in which εi,t is the error term, and lnθi,t−1 is the productivity shock, which is derived by taking
the expectation of equation (35) and by noting that lnEt−1 (θi,t)=ρ+
σ2
ε




2 is included in the constant term. The coeﬃcient π4 measures the intensity of ﬁnancing
constraints. Under the assumption of no ﬁnancing constraints the reduced form coeﬃcients











In the model the user cost of variable capital is constant and equal to R for ﬁnancially un-
constrained ﬁrms. In reality the user cost of capital may vary across ﬁrms and over time for
several reasons unrelated to ﬁnancing imperfections, such as transaction costs, taxes, and risk.
Therefore in equation (43) we also include ﬁrm and year dummy variables, respectively ai and
dt. These capture, among other things, the changes in the user cost of capital across ﬁrms and
over time for all the ﬁrms.
We estimate the productivity shock lnθi,t−1 from the Solow residual of the production func-
tion at the beginning of period t. The method used is robust to the presence of decreasing
returns to scale and to heterogeneity in technology (see appendix 6 for details).
We compute wF
t , the net ﬁnancial wealth at the beginning of period t, by using the budget
constraint (9) at time t − 1 to substitute bt in (8):
wF






Πt ≡ yt − Rt (lt + it−1)
In the model, Πt are proﬁts generated from the investment in period t−1, and are realized at
the beginning of period t. Therefore we estimate Πt as the operative proﬁts during period t−1





as the net short-term ﬁnancial assets (after dividend payments) plus the stock of ﬁnished goods
inventories at the beginning of period t − 1. We include the stock of ﬁnished goods inventories
25because most of such goods will be transformed into cash ﬂow during period t − 1. Rt is equal
to one plus the average real interest rate during period t − 1.
The concave transformation of wealth in equation (24) can be computed only if wF
t is positive.
The simulations of the model show that, for reasonable parameter values, ﬁnancial wealth is
always positive in an economy with ﬁnancing frictions. This is because such frictions at the
same time reduce the maximum amount of borrowing and give incentive to ﬁrms to accumulate
ﬁnancial assets. The empirical data are consistent with this ﬁnding, because the variable wF
t is
positive for 95.2% ﬁrm-year observations. Among the 4.8% negative observations, nearly half
are excluded as outliers. In order to include the remaining negative observations, we consider
an alternative deﬁnition of ﬁnancial wealth based on the following modiﬁcation of the borrowing
constraint (9):
bi,t+1 ≤ υki,t+1 + bi, (46)
in which bi represents the collateral value of ﬁrm i in addition to the residual value of its assets.
It can be interpreted as intangible collateral assets (for example from relationship lending). In








t )η if wF
t ≤ wmax (47)
wF
t = wF
t + bi (48)
We estimate bi as the average borrowing of a ﬁrm in excess of the collateral value of the
ﬁrm’s ﬁxed assets. The value bi is found to be positive for 125 ﬁrms (30% of the total). wF
t is
positive for 97.5% ﬁrm-year observations.
The estimation of equation (43) is complicated by the endogeneity of the regressors. First, all
the regressors are most likely correlated to the ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀect ai. Second, lnni,t is endogenous
because it is simultaneously determined with lnli,t. Third, the other right-hand side variables
are predetermined, but they may still be endogenous and correlated to εi,t.I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
if all the relevant information about future expected productivity is summarized by lnθi,t−1,
then εi,t should be uncorrelated to the predetermined regressors. Otherwise an unobservable
and persistent productivity shock in period t − 1 may at the same time aﬀect wF
i,t−1, ki,t−1 and
26εi,t and cause an error-regressor correlation. The same problem may be caused by a persistent
measurement error. In this case, a suitable estimation strategy is to ﬁrst diﬀerence equation (43)
in order to eliminate the unobservable ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀect ai, and then estimate it with a GMM
estimation technique, using the available lagged levels and ﬁrst diﬀerences of the explanatory
variables as instruments. In this case, the set of instruments is diﬀerent for each year and
equation (43) is estimated as a system of cross sectional equations, each one corresponding to a
diﬀerent period t (Arellano and Bond, 1991). More recent lags are likely to be better instruments,
but they may be correlated with the error term if the unobservable productivity shock is very
persistent. The test of overidentifying restrictions can be used to assess the orthogonality of






, ∆zi,t−j is a valid instrument for equation (43) estimated
in levels. Blundell and Bond (1998) propose a System GMM estimation technique that uses
both the equation in level (instrumented using lagged ﬁrst diﬀerences), and the equation in ﬁrst
diﬀerences (instrumented using lagged levels). They show, with Monte Carlo simulations, that
the System GMM estimator is much more eﬃcient than the simple GMM estimator when the
regressors are highly persistent, and when the number of observations is small. These properties
are particularly useful in our context. Table XV shows the test of the validity of the instruments
for the estimation of equation (43). The upper part reports the p-value of the HansenJ statistic
that tests the orthogonality of the instruments. The bottom part of table XV reports the F
statistic of the excluded instruments and the partial R2 from Shea (1997). The table shows
that the t-1 to t-3 ﬁrst diﬀerences as instruments for the equation in levels and the t-3 levels as
instruments for the equation in ﬁrst diﬀerences are not rejected by the orthogonality test and
are suﬃciently correlated to the regressors for the coeﬃcients of equation (43) to be identiﬁed.
The primary objective of this empirical analysis is to verify that the coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t−1 in
equation (43) is a precise indicator of the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints. We do it by using the
qualitative information provided by the Mediocredito Survey, which allows us to select ﬁrms more
likely to be ﬁnancially constrained. We also select ﬁrms according to some exogenous criteria
commonly used in the previous literature as indicators of ﬁnancing imperfections: i) dividend
27policy: ﬁrms that have higher cost (or rationing) of external ﬁnance than of internally generated
ﬁnance are less likely to distribute dividends. Therefore the observed dividend policy should be
correlated to the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints. ii) Size and age: smaller and younger ﬁrms
usually are more subject to informational asymmetries that may generate ﬁnancing constraints.
More speciﬁcally, we estimate equation (43) for subsamples of ﬁrms selected according to the
dummy variable Dx
i,t, w h i c hi se q u a lt o1i ft h eﬁrm i belongs to the speciﬁcg r o u px, and
zero otherwise. Among the direct criteria, Dhs identiﬁes ﬁrms that declare too high a cost of
banking debt (13.7% of all ﬁrms); Dlc identiﬁes ﬁrms with lack of medium-long term ﬁnancing
(13.2% of all ﬁrms).8 Among the indirect criteria Dage identiﬁes ﬁrms founded after 1979 (16%
of all ﬁrms); Ddivpol identiﬁes ﬁrms with zero dividends in any period (33.4% of all ﬁrms); Dsize
identiﬁes ﬁrms with less than 65 employees (in 1992) (16% of all ﬁrms).
We estimate the coeﬃcients of equation (43) separately for each group of ﬁrms and for
the complementary sample by interacting the above criteria with the explanatory variables,
the constant, the yearly dummies and all the instruments. The Dhs and Dlc dummies are
potentially endogenous, because an unobservable shock may at the same time be correlated
with the likelihood of declaring ﬁn a n c i n gc o n s t r a i n t sa n dw i t ht h ee r r o rt e r mi ne q u a t i o n( 4 3 ) .
However, this problem is not likely to bias the GMM estimates of equation (43) because we
exclusively adopt cross sectional selection rules. In other words, Heckman (1979) shows that
the selection bias can be represented as an omitted variable problem. But we do not allow ﬁrms
to wander in and out of the constrained group, and therefore the omitted term is also constant
over time for each ﬁrm and is absorbed by the ﬁxed eﬀect in the estimation. Because the GMM
estimator used in the paper is based on ﬁrst diﬀerences, it is robust to this type of cross sectional
bias.
Another potential problem is measurement errors in the Survey. For example, at the time of
the 1992 Survey, Mediocredito Centrale was a state-controlled ﬁnancial institution whose main
8We do not select ﬁrms according to the question concerning “lack of guarantees” because only 2% of ﬁrms
answer positively, and almost all of those are already included in the D
lc and D
hs groups.
Also, among all the ﬁrms in the sample 8% did not declare any investment project in the Mediocredito Survey,
and therefore did not answer the questions about ﬁnancing constraints. We keep these ﬁrms in the unconstrained
sample, but one may also argue that perhaps some of these ﬁrms did not invest precisely because they may have
been ﬁnancially constrained. In order to control for this possibility we repeated the analysis excluding such ﬁrms
from the sample, obtaining results very similar to those reported in the following sections.
28objective was to provide subsidized credit to small and medium ﬁrms. Therefore it may be that
those ﬁrms declaring the problem of “lack of medium-long term ﬁnancing” were actually sending
strategic messages to the institution. However virtually all of the subsidized credit administrated
by Mediocredito Centrale has been directed to the South of Italy. Indeed, among the ﬁrms in
the 1992 Mediocredito Survey none of the ﬁrms from the North and Central Italy had beneﬁted
from any subsidized credit, while as much as 58.7% of the ﬁrms from the South had. Therefore
this problem can be controlled for by excluding from the Dlc group the ﬁrms from South Italy,
which are 5% of the total (dummy Dlc
−south).
Another problem is that the Dlc = 1 group may include some distressed ﬁrms that need
more banking debt in order to survive, not because they need to ﬁnance a proﬁtable project.
The structure of the 1992 Survey, which only allows ﬁrms to declare ﬁnancing problems if they
actually undertook a new investment project, should avoid this problem. Nonetheless, we control
for this by considering an alternative selection criterion that excludes from the Dlc group also
the 10% of ﬁrms with lower average ratio of gross proﬁts over sales (dummy Dlc
−s.&lowyeld).
Table VI illustrates the summary statistics. The whole sample is composed almost entirely
of small ﬁrms. 50% of the ﬁrms have under 123 employees and 90% under 433. Virtually
all of these ﬁrms are privately owned and not quoted on the stock market. Likely ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms do not show signiﬁcant diﬀerences with respect to the other ﬁrms in terms
of size, growth rate of sales, investment rates, riskiness (volatility of output) and gross income
margin. The most noticeable diﬀerences concern the ﬁnancial structure. Firms that declare
ﬁnancing constraints are less wealthy, on average pay higher interest rates on banking debt and
have a lower net income margin.
Table VII shows the estimation results of equation (43) for the whole sample and for the
groups selected according to the “direct criteria” dummies. In the ﬁr s tc o l u m nw eu s et h ed a t a
from the 1986-91 period, for which we have available the full set of instruments. In the other
columns we estimate the model for the shorter 1988-91 period.9
The full sample estimates in the ﬁrst two columns show that the coeﬃcients of lnθi,t, lnki,t−1
9We restrict the sample because the Mediocredito Survey refers to the 1989-91 period, but 5% of the investment
projects surveyed actually started in 1988.
29and lnni,t are all signiﬁcant and all have the expected sign and size. The coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t is
very small in magnitude and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This suggests that ﬁnancing
constraints do not aﬀect a large share of ﬁrms in the sample, and is consistent with the informa-
tion from the Mediocredito Survey, where only 22% of the ﬁrms state some problem in ﬁnancing
investment.
The remaining columns in table VII allow all the coeﬃcients to vary across the subgroups
of ﬁrms. In the third and fourth columns, the ﬁrst set of coeﬃcients is relative to the group of
ﬁrms that declare the problem of too high cost of debt (Dhs =0 ) . The second set of coeﬃcients
are relative to all the regressors multiplied by Dhs. They represent the diﬀerence between the
coeﬃcient for the likely constrained ﬁrms (Dhs = 1) and that of the complementary sample
(Dhs = 0). Therefore the t-statistic of this second set of estimates can be used to test the
equality of the coeﬃcients across groups. Column “1” uses the deﬁnition of ﬁnancial wealth
in equation (45), and column “2” includes also the observations with negative ﬁnancial wealth
using the broader deﬁnition in equation (48). The results show that the coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t is
positive, large in absolute value, and strongly signiﬁcant for the likely constrained ﬁrms, and
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for the likely unconstrained ﬁrms. This result conﬁrms
t h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁnancing constraints on the investment decisions of the ﬁrms that declare the
problem of too high cost of debt in ﬁnancing new investment projects. The last six columns
report the results of the estimations that use the question about the lack of medium-long term
credit to select ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. Also in this case the coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t is higher
for the Dlc = 1 group than for the complementary sample, and is always very signiﬁcant after we
correct for the possible presence of distressed and false reporting ﬁrms ( Dlc
−south and Dlc
−s.&lowyield
columns). By adding the coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t to the coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t ∗ Di,t we obtain the
wealth coeﬃcient for the constrained ﬁrms. This ranges from 0.17 to 0.28 for the Dhc and
Dlc
−s.&lowyield groups. These values are quite high compared to the same coeﬃcient estimated
for the constrained ﬁrms in the simulated industry (see table II). Simulation results in table
IV show that the coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t−1 increases the tighter the collateral constraint (5) is.
Therefore the empirical results may indicate that physical capital has a low collateral value for
30the ﬁrms in the 1992 Mediocredito Survey.
The estimated coeﬃcients of lnki,t−1 and lnθi,t−1 do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across the two
groups of ﬁrms. The coeﬃcient of lnni,t is lower for the ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, even
though its value is always positive and consistent with the restrictions of the structural model.
The fact that the estimated coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t is zero for the whole sample and for the groups
of unconstrained ﬁr m sa l l o w su st ou s eb π1,b π2 and b π3 to estimate the structural parameters α,β
and γ, using the restrictions in (44). The estimated b α,b β and b γ are reported in table VIII. These
are consistent with the values directly estimated from the production function (see table XIV)
and with the simple calculation of the elasticities using the factors shares of output, which are
reported at the bottom of table VIII. The fact that the restrictions imposed by the structural
model on the coeﬃcients of lnθi,t, lnki,t−1 and lnni,t are not rejected by the estimation results
is important because it conﬁrms the validity of our structural model. By using the estimate of
b β =0 .502 we ﬁnd b η to be equal to 0.13 for the Dhs = 1 group . According to equation (24) this
implies that if wF
t is 80% of wMAX
t , then the shadow value of the binding borrowing constraint
is equal to 2.9%. This value increases to 9.4% if wF
t is 50% of wMAX
t .
In table IX we estimate equation (43) for the 1986-91 sample, and we allow the coeﬃcients to
vary for the groups identiﬁed by the indirect criteria Dage,D divpol and Dsize. The coeﬃcient of
lnwF
i,t is always very small and always not signiﬁcant for the likely unconstrained ﬁrms, while it
is signiﬁcantly positive for all the groups of likely constrained ﬁrms except the Ddivpol = 1 group.
Regarding the other independent variables, the coeﬃcients estimated for the likely unconstrained
ﬁrms are always consistent with the restrictions of the structural model.
Among all the criteria used to split the sample, only the zero dividend policy has a limited
ability to select ﬁrms with higher correlation between variable investment and internal ﬁnance.
This weak result may be due to an endogeneity problem in the selection criterion. Another
possible explanation of this ﬁnding is that for privately owned ﬁrms, the zero dividend policy
is not a very useful indicator of the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints. This is because for many
ﬁrms in the sample the controlling shareholders are also the managers of the ﬁrms. These ﬁrms
may choose zero dividends not because they are ﬁnancially constrained, but because they have
31other ways of distributing revenues (such as in the form of compensation to managers) that are
more tax eﬃcient than dividends.
VI Robustness checks
Tables VII and IX show that the sensitivity of variable capital investment to internal ﬁnance
is a useful indicator of the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints. We argue that this ﬁnding is
robust. First, this result is not likely to be driven by misspeciﬁcation problems. The correct
speciﬁcation of equation (43) is conﬁrmed by the fact that we obtain plausible estimates of the
structural parameters of the model. Second, our ﬁndings are robust to the possible criticism
that the coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t is positive because the productivity shock is measured with error.
The analysis of the simulated data indicates that the coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t is not aﬀected by the
measurement error in θi,t, because the two variables are uncorrelated. Our empirical results are
consistent with this ﬁnding because the coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t is always negative or not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero, except for the group of likely ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.
Therefore the claim that the results are driven by measurement error in θ requires that: i)
lnθi,t does not capture the unobservable productivity shock; ii) the unobservable productivity
s h o c ki sh i g h l yc o r r e l a t e dt ol nwF
i,t for likely constrained ﬁrms only, because these are on average
more productive and grow faster than unconstrained ﬁrms. Assumption (i) is not very plausible,
because the coeﬃcient of lnθi,t is signiﬁcant and always has the expected sign and size for the
likely unconstrained ﬁrms. Assumption (ii) is not plausible because table VI shows that ﬁrms
more likely to be ﬁnancially constrained have a similar proﬁtability to the other ﬁrms. These
considerations indicate that the diﬀerences in the coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t across groups are unlikely
to be driven by unobservable investment opportunities.
Another possible criticism is that the lnwF
i,t coeﬃcient captures changes in the user cost of
capital that are not related to ﬁnancing constraints. By ﬁrst diﬀerencing and introducing year
dummy variables we already take into account diﬀerences in the user costs of capital across ﬁrms
or changes over time for all the ﬁrms. But one could object that the coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t can
be positive in the absence of ﬁnancing imperfections if an increase in wealth is systematically
32correlated to a positive shock in the quality of the ﬁrm’s projects that also makes its investment
less risky. We argue that it would be hard to justify such a systematic relationship. More
importantly, if this is true then we should observe a positive coeﬃcient of wealth for all ﬁrms,
while this does not happen in our sample. The only possibility would then be that such a
systematic relationship only holds for likely ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, because these are
more risky, or because they are younger ﬁrms for which the quality of the management is very
uncertain, and so their perceived riskiness is highly dependent on current performance. The
results above allow us to reject both arguments. First, even though younger ﬁrms have a higher
coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t, it is possible to show that if we exclude these ﬁrms from the sample (the
Dage = 1 observations), we still obtain the same results illustrated in tables VII and IX.10
Second, likely ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms do not seem, on average, riskier than the other ﬁrms
(see table VI). Other robustness checks are illustrated in the following subsections A − C.
A Alternative deﬁnition of wealth
In this section we estimate equation (43) using a deﬁnition of wealth that does not include
ﬁnished good inventories, called e wF
i,t . Table X shows the estimation results relative to the
groups selected according to both the direct and the indirect criteria. The narrower deﬁnition of
wealth implies that 16% of the observations with negative values of e wF
i,t are not included. Most
of these observations are from ﬁrms with low ﬁnancial wealth that belong to the constrained
groups (24% in the Dlc = 1 group and 23% in the Dhc = 1 group). This explains why the
magnitude of the coeﬃcient of ln e wF
i,t for these groups is much reduced. However the results still
largely conﬁrm the ﬁndings of tables VII and IX. In particular the coeﬃcient of ln e wF
i,t is always
negative and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for the unconstrained sample. It is instead
always larger for the constrained sample, and in three out of ﬁve cases also signiﬁcantly so.
B Collateral value of the assets
The model developed in section III assumes that ﬁxed capital is the only physical collateral
available to the ﬁrm. However allowing for variable capital to be collateral does not change the
10Detailed results of the regressions performed after eliminating younger ﬁrms from the sample are available
upon request.
33predictions of the model nor the interpretation of the results. If variable capital instead of ﬁxed
capital is the collateral of the ﬁrm, then equation (5) becomes:
bt+1 ≤ υllt+1 (49)
0 < υl ≤ 1







lt+1 + kt+1 = wF
t +( 1− δk)kt−1 (50)
The larger υl is, the smaller is the ﬁnancial wealth needed to ﬁnance variable investment.
This is equivalent to assuming that wmax is smaller. Therefore if υl is suﬃciently large then no
ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained and ﬁnancial wealth should not be signiﬁcant in equation (43) for
both likely constrained and likely unconstrained ﬁrms. We ﬁnd the opposite, conﬁrming that υl
is relatively small in our sample. This ﬁnding is realistic because even though variable inputs
are partly ﬁnanced with trade credit, which is usually considered a form of collateralized debt,
in practice trade credit is very costly. The annualized interest rate that ﬁrms implicitly pay on
trade credit is often found to be above 40% (Ng et al., 1999).
C Estimations on the alternative dataset
In this section we estimate equation (43) on the alternative sample based on the 1998 and 2001
Mediocredito Surveys. Each Survey asks the same type of questions about ﬁnancing constraints,
allowing us to pool them and obtain a larger sample. The disadvantage is that this alterna-
tive sample has less detailed balance sheet data: we do not have information about plant and
equipment separated from land and building, we do not have information about distributed and
retained earnings, and we have a less detailed description of the assets and liabilities.
Following the same procedure adopted for the main sample, we eliminate mergers and ac-
quisitions and we include ﬁrms with at least 8 years of balance sheet data, so to have a complete
set of instrumental variables in both surveys. Moreover this sample also contains a small frac-
tion of ﬁrms with less than 15 employees (2.1% of the total in this sample). The Employment
34Protection Law in Italy only applies to ﬁrms larger than 15 employees, and it imposes very
high ﬁring costs. Therefore many very small ﬁrms decide not to grow above the 15-employee
threshold in order to keep more ﬂexibility (Schivardi and Torrini, 2004). This behavior distorts
the relationship between ﬁnancing frictions, productivity shock and investment and would bias
the results of our regressions. Therefore we eliminate these ﬁrms from the sample, remaining
with an unbalanced panel of 964 ﬁrms and 7305 observations.
In the ﬁnance section of the surveys ﬁrms are asked the following questions (in parentheses
the percentage of positive answers in the 1998 and 2001 survey respectively):
1) “during the last year, did the ﬁrm desire to borrow more at the interest rate prevailing
on the market?” (13.5%, 19.3%)
2) “If the previous answer was yes: was the ﬁrm willing to pay and higher interest rate in
order to get additional credit?” (5.0%, 6.9%)
3) “During the last year, did the ﬁrm ask for more credit without obtaining it?” (3.5%,
4.9%)
With respect to the questions in the 1992 Survey, these questions are less informative about
the ﬁnancing constraints faced by the ﬁrms in ﬁnancing investment, as they are not speciﬁcally
linked to the investment section. Another inconvenience is that these questions explicitly refer
to only one sample year rather than to the whole of the three years covered by the survey.
We ﬁnd question (3) largely redundant, as few ﬁrms signal this problem and less than 0.5%
of ﬁrms answer positively to question (3) without answering positively also to question (1).
Question (2) is also a subset of question (1), but it may be able to identify a group of more
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms, with a higher shadow value of money. Therefore we use questions
(1) and (2) to construct the following dummies:
Drationed




i =1i fﬁrm i answers positively to question (2) in either the 1998 or the 2001
Survey and 0 otherwise.




i respectively. While we do not have the information about dividend policy for
these ﬁrms, we can construct the dummies relative to the size and age criteria: Dage identiﬁes
ﬁrms founded after 1982 (16% of all ﬁrms); Dsize identiﬁes ﬁrms with less than 25 employees
(16% of all ﬁrms). For these indirect dummies we choose the thresholds in order to have a
fraction of constrained ﬁrms equal to the fraction in the age and size dummies used before.
Table XI illustrates the estimations of equation (43). We construct all variables following the
same procedure adopted for the main sample. On exception is that we do not use the perpetual
inventory method to compute the stock of ﬁxed capital, because the time series is too short
for most of the ﬁrms in the sample. Instead we evaluate it at book value. Moreover we do
not subtract the dividend payments for the calculation of wF
t−1, b e c a u s ew ed on o th a v et h i s
information for this sample.
The results obtained for the Drationed
i and D
payhigher
i dummies conﬁrm the validity of the
ﬁnancing constraints test. The coeﬃcient of lnwF
t−1 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
for the likely unconstrained ﬁrms and is always positive and signiﬁcantly higher for the likely
constrained ﬁrms. Moreover the estimate of the coeﬃcient of lnwF
t−1 for the ﬁrms that answer
yes to both questions 1and 2 (the sum the coeﬃcients of lnwF




higher than for the ﬁrms that answer yes only to question 1, as predicted by the model. The
estimated coeﬃcients of lnθi,t, lnki,t−1 and lnni,t are always strongly signiﬁcant for the likely
unconstrained ﬁrms and do not show signiﬁcant deviations for the likely constrained ﬁrms.
The coeﬃcient of lnwF
t−1 was estimated to be between 0.17 and 0.28 in the panel based on
the 1992 Survey. Instead the same coeﬃcient is between 0.11 and 0.23 for the alternative panel
of ﬁrms based on the 1998 and 2001 surveys. Moreover in the alternative panel the coeﬃcient
of lnwF
t−1 is always higher for younger and smaller ﬁrms than for the complementary samples,
but the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant in only one out of four cases.
Because in both panels the estimates for the likely unconstrained ﬁrms are consistent with
the predictions of the model, we can interpret these ﬁndings as evidence that the intensity of
ﬁnancing constraints on ﬁrm investment was lower in the 1995-2000 period than in the 1988-
1991 period. This may due to the increased eﬃciency of the Italian ﬁnancial sector after 1992,
36driven by the liberalization of ﬁnancial services in the Euro area. For example Jappelli and
Pistaferri (2000) notice that until the beginning of the 90’s the average down payment ratio in
Italy for mortgaged debt was usually between 40 and 50 percent, as opposed to 20 percent in the
US and 15 percent in the UK. However the same authors notice that since 1994 Italian banks
started to oﬀer mortgages with down payment requirements as low as 20 percent, in response
to increased internal and international competition. This may have reduced considerably the
ﬁnancing frictions faced by small and young Italian ﬁrms.
VII Conclusions
In this paper we develop a new test to detect ﬁnancing constraints on ﬁrm investment. The test
is derived from a structural multifactor model of ﬁrm investment with ﬁnancing imperfections
and is based on a reduced form variable capital investment equation.
We solve the model using a numerical method and we simulate two industries, one with
quadratic adjustment costs, the other with the irreversibility of ﬁxed capital. Both industries
are calibrated to match the US industry. The results of the simulations show that the correlation
between variable capital investment and internal ﬁnance is a useful indicator of the intensity of
ﬁnancing constraints, even when ﬁrm investment opportunities are estimated with error, and
regardless of the type of adjustment costs of ﬁxed capital.
We verify the validity of this test on two samples of Italian manufacturing ﬁrms. First, the
estimation results do not reject the restrictions imposed by the structural parameters. Second,
the sensitivity of variable investment to internal ﬁnance is never signiﬁcant, and is always very
small, for the groups of ﬁrms ap r i o r inot expected to be ﬁnancially constrained. By contrast,
it is signiﬁcantly greater than zero, and often large, for likely ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. The
fact that the reduced form parameters do not reject the restrictions imposed by the structural
model implies that we can interpret the magnitude of this sensitivity as an indicator of the
intensity of ﬁnancing constraints.
One important property of this test is that it does not require the information about the
market value of the ﬁrm. Because it requires only the information present in balance sheet data,
37it can be easily applied to small privately owned ﬁrms not quoted on the stock markets. This
property is useful for the literature that studies the consequences of ﬁnancing imperfections for
aggregate ﬂuctuations, such as the literature on the ﬁnancial accelerator and that on the credit
channel of monetary policy.
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Appendix 1
I no r d e rt op r o v et h a tas o l u t i o nt ot h eﬁrm’s investment problem exists and is unique, it is
helpful to deﬁne the value function in (11) as follows:





Et [Vt+1 (at+1,θt+1,k t+1,l t+1)] (51)
We use equations (1), (7), (8) and (9) to rewrite πt as a function of the state variables in




t + at +( 1− δk)kt −
at+1
R




t with α + β < 1 (53)
The return function πt is real valued and continuous. Moreover it is bounded, because the
production function is concave, the productivity shock θt is a stationary process, and assumption
1 ensures that at is bounded. Finally equation (52) proves that πt is strictly increasing in the
state variables at time t. Since constraints (5), (9) and (6) deﬁne a compact and convex feasibility
s e tf o rt h ec h o i c ev a r i a b l e slt+1, kt+1,b t+1 and dt, it follows that the model satisﬁes the conditions
for theorems 9.6 and 9.8 in Stokey and Lucas (1989), ensuring that the solution to the problem
exists and is unique.
Appendix 2
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 .
wmax
t is the level of ﬁnancial wealth that allows the ﬁnancing of all proﬁtable investment
projects. If wF
t ≥ wmax
t then lt+1 = l∗
t+1 (θt,k t)a n dkt+1 = k∗
t+1 (θt,k t). It follows that wmax
t









t +( 1− δ)kt (54)
Suppose now that wF
t decreases below wmax
t . Equation (54) cannot be satisﬁed with equality.
If the irreversibility constraint is binding with equality, then kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt. In this case a
reduction of wF
t causes a reduction in lt+1 below l∗
t+1. The proof of proposition 1 follows by the





is decreasing and concave in lt+1
conditional on kt+1 =( 1− δ)kt.
If the irreversibility constraint is not binding, then both lt+1 and kt+1 must decrease as
wF
t decreases below wmax






is decreasing and concave in wF
t , because the production function is
concave in both factors.
Appendix 3
We brieﬂy describe the method we use to solve the dynamic maximization problem of the
ﬁrm. We discretise the state space of wt,kt and θt in 20 grid points for each variable. We model θI
as a two states i.i.d. process. We guess the value function Et [Vt+1 (wt+1,θt+1,k t+1)], and based
on this guess we ﬁnd the policy functions kt+1 (wt,θt,k t),l t+1 (wt,θt,k t)a n dbt+1 (wt,θt,k t)
that maximize Vt (wt,θt,k t). We use the maximized value function to reformulate a guess of
Et [Vt+1 (wt+1,θt+1,k t+1)], and we repeat this procedure until convergence is achieved
Appendix 4
We describe here the variables used in the empirical analysis of the paper:
p
y
tyi,t: total revenues realized during year t, at current prices.
pk
tki,t: sum of the replacement value of: i) plants and equipment; ii) intangible ﬁxed capital
(Software, Advertising, Research and Development). We include in pk
tki,t all capital purchased














j={1,2}, where 1=plant and equipment and 2= intangible ﬁxed capital . π1 = % change
in the producer prices index for agricultural and industrial machinery (source: OECD, from
Datastream); π2 = % change in the producer prices index (source: OECD, from Datastream).
δj are estimated separately for the 20 manufacturing sectors using aggregate annual data on the
replacement value and the total depreciation of the capital (source: ISTAT, the Italian National
Statistical Institute). Given that within each sector depreciation rates vary only marginally
between years, we conveniently used the average over the sample period: δ1 ranges from 9.3%
to 10.7%, and δ2 from 8.4% to 10.6%.
pl
tli,t : this variable measures the usage of variable inputs, at current prices, and is computed
as follows: beginning-of-period t input inventories (materials and work in progress), plus new
purchases of materials in period t, minus end-of-period t input inventories.
pn
t ni,t : this variable includes the total cost of the labor in year t, at current prices.
pw
t wF
i,t =O p e r a t i v ep r o ﬁts during period t−1 (value of production minus the cost of produc-
tion inputs) plus the net short-term ﬁnancial assets (after dividend payments) and the stock of




i,t is equal to pw
t wF
i,t minus the stock of ﬁnished goods inventories.
In order to transform the variables into real terms, we used the following price indexes
(source: ISTAT, the Italian National Statistical Institute):
p
y
t: consumer price index relative to all products excluding services.
pw




t : producer price index of durable inputs.
pn
t : wage earnings index of the manufacturing sector.
pl
t: wholesale price index for intermediate goods.
42Appendix 5
In this section we illustrate the procedure used to estimate the productivity shock lnθi,t.
First, we directly estimate the output elasticities to factor inputs α,β and γ. We consider the
production function in equation (41). Table XII reports summary statistics of yi,t,ki,t,li,t and
ni,t. By taking logs, we have the following linearized version of equation (41):
lnyi,t = ai + dt + xs,t + αlnki,t−1 + β lnli,t + γ lnni,t + εi,t (55)
ai is the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect. dt is the time eﬀect and xs,t is the sector eﬀect (we consider two
digit sectors as classiﬁed by ISTAT). In order to allow some heterogeneity in the technology
employed by ﬁrms in diﬀerent sectors, equation (55) is separately estimated for seven groups of
ﬁrms. Each group is composed of ﬁrms with as homogeneous as possible production activity.
Table XIII shows the composition of the groups. Because we estimate equation (41) also for those
ﬁrms that split or merged during the sample period, the total number is 561 ﬁrms. Equation
(55) is estimated by ﬁrst diﬀerencing and then using GMM with instrumental variables, on the
sample from 1985 to 1991. We use both lagged ﬁrst diﬀerences and levels as instruments for
the equation in ﬁrst diﬀerences. We consider lags -1and -2. This means that we exclude year
1982, in order to diminish possible distortions caused by the perpetual inventory method, and
we have the data from 1983 and 1984 available as instruments. Table XIV reports estimation
results. The ﬁrst column is relative to the whole sample, while the next seven columns show
the estimates of b α, b β and b γ for the seven groups separately. The Wald test shows that the
restriction b α + b β + b γ = 1 is rejected in favor of b α + b β + b γ < 1 for all groups except group 7.
The estimated output elasticity of variable capital b β ranges between 0.29 and 0.56, and in three
groups it is higher than the output elasticity of labor b γ. These high estimates of β are quite
common in ﬁrm-level estimates of the production function (see for example Hall and Mairesse,
1996). Output elasticity of ﬁxed capital b α ranges between 0.04 and 0.11. This range of values is
reasonable and consistent with the factor shares of output, given the amount of ﬁxed capital as
opposed to variable capital used in the production (see tables VIII and XII), and the diﬀerence
in the user costs of ﬁxed and variable capital caused by the diﬀerence in the depreciation factors.
The yearly depreciation rate of plant and equipment is around 10%, while the depreciation rate
of the usage of materials is by construction equal to 100%. The overidentifying restrictions are
rejected for the estimation of the whole sample, but not for the estimations for each group of
ﬁrms. Using the estimated elasticities b α, b β and b γ we compute total factor productivity for all
the ﬁrm years observations:
d TFTi,t =l nyt − b αlnki,t−1 + b β lnli,t − b γ lnni,t (56)
We then regress d TFTi,t on ﬁxed eﬀects, year and sector dummy variables. The estimated
residual from this regression is lnθi,t, which is the estimated productivity shock at the beginning
of period t +1 .
43VIII Figures
Figure 1: Financial wealth and intensity of ﬁnancing constraints
 
IX Tables
Table I: Calibrated parameters and matched moments.
Parameter values Empirical restriction Matched moments
Q. adj. costs Irrev. Data Q.a.c Irr.
r 0.02 0.02 Real interest rate 0.02 0.02 0.02
α 0.105 0.08 Returns to scale 0.97 0.97 0.97
β 0.865 0.89 Fixed capital/variable capital 0.5-0.7 0.82 0.68
δk 0.12 0.12 Depr. of ﬁxed capital 0.12 0.12 0.12
δl 1 1 Depr. of variab. capital 11 1
b 0.0002 n.a. Average(I/K) 0.145 0.176 0.161
ρ 0.8 0.95 Std.(I/K) 0.139 0.126 0.172
σε 0.02 0.01 Autocorr.(I/K) 0.239 0.222 0.200
ξ 0.07 0.04 Std.(CF/K) 0.21 0.14 0.12
τ 1-δk 1-δk Debt/assets ratio 0.20 0.15 0.16
γ 0.94 0.94 6% ﬁrms exit each year 6% 6% 6%
44Table II: The variable capital model with ﬁnancial wealth. No measurement errors.
regression: lnli,t = π0 + π1 lnEt−1 (θi,t)+π2 lnki,t + π3 lnwF
i,t−1 + εi,t
Quad. adjust. costs Irreversibility
Industry without ﬁnancing frictions
constant -1.22 -1.262






i,t−1,lnEt−1 (θi,t)) 0.01 -0.48
corr(lnCFi,t−1,lnEt−1 (θi,t)) 0.52 0.91
Industry with ﬁnancing frictions
constant -0.986 -0.294






i,t−1,lnEt−1 (θi,t)) 0.03 -0.05
corr(lnCFi,t−1,lnEt−1 (θi,t)) 0.30 0.79







80% most constr. ﬁrms 0.008 0.002 0.055 0.014
(λ=0.5%) (λ=0.09%) (λ=1.9%) (λ=0.1%)
60% most constr. ﬁrms 0.011 0.003 0.066 0.027
(λ=0.6%) (λ=0.1%) (λ=2.4%) (λ=0.3%)
0.019 0.004 0.087 0.038
(λ=0.7%) (λ=0.2%) (λ=3.1%) (λ=0.6%)
0.037 0.005 0.172 0.046
(λ=1.0%) (λ=0.3%) (λ=4.2%) (λ=0.9%)
regression: lnli,t = π0 + π1 lnEt−1 (θi,t)+π2 lnki,t + π3 lnwF
i,t−1 + π4 lnwmax
i,t−1 + εi,t
Coeﬃcient of lnwF







80% most constr. ﬁrms 0.007 0.002 0.055 0.012
60% most constr. ﬁrms 0.011 0.003 0.063 0.027
40% most constr. ﬁrms 0.017 0.004 0.082 0.037
20% most constr. ﬁrms 0.043 0.005 0.161 0.045
TSLS estimates on simulated data. lnkt is instrumented by lnkt−1. All the estimated coeﬃcients are
statistically signiﬁcant. The lower part of the table compares the estimates of π3 for diﬀerent subsamples
selected according to the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints. All the diﬀerences across coeﬃcients are
statistically signiﬁcant.
45Table III: The variable capital model with ﬁnancial wealth, with and without measurement
errors in the productivity shock.
regression: lnli,t = π0 + π1 lnEt−1 (θi,t)
∗ + π2 lnki,t + π3 lnwF
i,t−1 + εi,t
Quadratic adjustment costs Irreversibility




















constant -1.22 -1.03 -0.451 -1.262 -0.38 0.28
lnEi,t−1 (θt)
∗ 7.404 6.064 1.620 9.170 4.241 0.464
lnki,t 0.778 0.826 0.993 0.726 0.876 0.992
lnwF
i,t−1 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
R2 1 0.98 0.93 1 0.99 0.99
Industry with ﬁnancing frictions
constant -0.986 -0.714 0.501 -0.294 -0.116 0.143
lnEi,t−1 (θt)
∗ 6.256 5.450 1.844 2.357 1.500 0.232
lnki,t 0.802 0.810 0.851 0.903 0.935 0.982
lnwF
i,t−1 0.006 0.002 -0.015 0.053 0.046 0.035
R2 1 0.99 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.98
Coeﬃcient of lnwF
i,t−1 for groups of constrained ﬁrms and the compl. sample
80% most constr. ﬁrms 0.008 0.004 -0.013 0.055 0.048 0.037
compl. sample 0.002 -0.001 -0.016 0.014 0.008 0.005
60% most constr. ﬁrms 0.011 0.009 -0.008 0.066 0.059 0.048
compl. sample 0.003 -0.001 -0.016 0.027 0.016 0.009
40% most constr. ﬁrms 0.019 0.017 0.003 0.087 0.080 0.067
compl. sample 0.004 0.000 -0.016 0.038 0.026 0.016
20% most constr. ﬁrms 0.037 0.039 0.040 0.172 0.165 0.151
compl. sample 0.005 0.001 -0.015 0.046 0.035 0.024
TSLS estimates on simulated data. lnkt is instrumented by lnkt−1. All the estimated coeﬃcients are
statistically signiﬁcant. The lower part of the table compares the estimates of π3 for diﬀerent subsamples
selected according to the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints. All the diﬀerences across coeﬃcients are
statistically signiﬁcant. When the coeﬃcient π3 is increasing in the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints, and
is positive for ﬁrms with ﬁnancing frictions, it is reported in bold.
46T a b l eI V :T h ev a r i a b l ec a p i t a lm o d e lw i t hﬁnancial wealth. Sensitivity to the collateral value of
capital (no measurement errors, industry with ﬁnancing frictions and irreversibility).
regression: lnli,t = π0 + π1 lnEt−1 (θi,t)+π2 lnki,t + π3 lnwF
i,t−1 + εi,t
bt ≤ (1 − δ)kt bt ≤ 0.85(1 − δ)kt bt ≤ 0.7(1 − δ)kt
constant -0.294 -0.304 -0.442
lnEi,t−1 (θt) 2.357 2.112 2.434
lnki,t 0.903 0.919 0.903
lnwF
i,t−1 0.053 0.053 0.067
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98
Coeﬃcient of lnwF










80% most constr. ﬁrms 0.055 0.014 0.057 0.015 0.073 0.002
(λ=1.9%) (λ=0.1%) (λ=2.1%) (λ=0.1%) (λ=2.5%) (λ=0.3%)
60% most constr. ﬁrms 0.066 0.027 0.071 0.028 0.092 0.038
(λ=2.4%) (λ=0.3%) (λ=2.6%) (λ=0.4%) (λ=3.0%) (λ=0.6%)
40% most constr. ﬁrms 0.087 0.038 0.094 0.038 0.138 0.047
(λ=3.1%) (λ=0.6%) (λ=3.3%) (λ=0.7%) (λ=3.8%) (λ=0.9%)
20% most constr. ﬁrms 0.172 0.046 0.181 0.045 0.252 0.056
(λ=4.2%) (λ=0.9%) (λ=4.5%) (λ=1.0%) (λ=5.1%) (λ=1.3%)
TSLS estimates on simulated data. lnkt is instrumented by lnkt−1. All the estimated coeﬃcients are
statistically signiﬁcant. The lower part of the table compares the estimates of π3 for diﬀerent subsamples
selected according to the intensity of ﬁnancing constraints. All the diﬀe r e n c e sa c r o s sc o e ﬃcients are
statistically signiﬁcant.
47Table V: The q-model with ﬁnancial wealth with and without measurement errors in q.
regression:
ii,t




Quad. adjust. costs Irreversibility








constant -9.97 -9.36 -4.81 -3.76 -3.55 -1.83
qi,t−1 9.97 9.36 4.88 3.98 3.76 2.01
wF
i,t−1
ki,t−1 -0.001 0.000 0.005 0.009 0.010 0.015
R2 1 0.94 0.49 0.12 0.11 0.07
Industry with ﬁnancing frictions
constant -0.95 -0.86 -0.29 -1.09 -1.01 -0.41
qi,t−1 1.01 0.928 0.423 1.20 1.12 0.55
wF
i,t−1
ki,t−1 0.020 0.018 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.002




ki,t−1 for groups of constrained ﬁrms and the compl. samples
80% most constr. ﬁrms 0.028 0.026 0.015 0.005 0.005 0.002
complementary sample 0.013 0.012 0.003 0.015 0.012 0.005
60% most constr.ﬁrms 0.041 0.041 0.035 0.007 0.006 0.001
complementary sample 0.015 0.013 0.003 0.008 0.007 0.003
40% most constr. ﬁrms 0.072 0.074 0.084 0.008 0.007 0.000
complementary sample 0.016 0.014 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.003
20% most constr. ﬁrms 0.122 0.132 0.168 0.042 0.041 0.027
complementary sample 0.017 0.016 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.003
regression using average Q:
ii,t






ki,t−1 for groups of constrained ﬁrms and the compl. samples
80% most constr. ﬁrms 0.556 0.562 0.589 0.592 0.611 0.704
complementary sample 0.533 0.537 0.556 0.625 0.630 0.655
60% most constr. ﬁrms 0.565 0.571 0.595 0.570 0.596 0.706
complementary sample 0.531 0.535 0.557 0.635 0.641 0.676
40% most constr. ﬁrms 0.569 0.575 0.595 0.551 0.582 0.707
complementary sample 0.540 0.544 0.568 0.627 0.637 0.682
20% most constr. ﬁrms 0.578 0.582 0.595 0.546 0.581 0.705
complementary sample 0.545 0.550 0.574 0.613 0.626 0.684
OLS estimates on simulated data. All the estimated coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant.
T h el o w e rp a r to ft h et a b l ecompares the estimates of α2 for diﬀerent subsamples selected
a c c o r d i n gt ot h ei n t e n s i t yo fﬁnancing constraints. All the diﬀe r e n c e sa c r o s sc o e ﬃcients are
statistically signiﬁcant. When the coeﬃcient α2 is increasing in the intensity of ﬁnancing
constraints, and is positive for ﬁrms with ﬁnancing frictions, it is reported in bold. Qi,t =
Vi,t/wi,t; CFi,t = yi,t − r
bi,t
R
48Table VI: Summary statistics, years 1982-1991.
All ﬁrms Dhs =1 Dlc =1
Mean ﬁxed assets3 6331 3136 4140
Median ﬁxed assets 2442 2200 3064
Mean number of employees 207 141 175
Median number of employees 123 119 131
90th percentile of employees 433 249 364
Short term banking debt/K 0.50 (0.15) 0.54 (0.13) 0.51 (0.14)
Long term banking debt/K 0.10 (0.08) 0.11 (0.09) 0.11 (0.07)
Average cost of debt2 .066 (.035) .075 (.037) .076 (.036)
Gross income margin .066 (.058) .065 (.046) .068 (.063)
Net income margin .018 (.05) .01 (.034) .014 (.05)
Net sales growth 0.11 (0.19) 0.11 (0.17) 0.12 (0.20)
Financial wealth/K1 1.50 (1.64) 1.11 (1.02) 1.19 (1.06)
Cash Flow/K 0.41 (0.57) 0.29 (0.26) 0.35 (0.43)
Fixed Investment/K 0.30 (0.34) 0.28 (0.30) 0.30 (0.28)
Volatility of output4 1.18 (0.22) 1.17 (0.24) 1.21 (0.25)
Number of ﬁrms 415 63 56
Number of observations 4150 630 560
Standard deviations in parentheses. K=ﬁxed assets. Financial wealth= operative proﬁts
during period t − 1( value of production minus the cost of production inputs) plus the
net short-term ﬁnancial assets (after dividend payments) and the stock of ﬁnished goods
inventories at the beginning of period t − 1 multiplied by one plus the nominal interest
rate. 1) Largest 1% and smallest 1% excluded from the computation of this statistic. 2)
Interest paid on banking debt divided by total banking debt. Average on the 1989-91
period. 3) Values are in billions of Italian Lire,1 9 8 2p r i c e s .1B i l l i o nl i r ew a se q u a lt o0 . 7 1
million US$ at the 1982 exchange rate. 4) Average of the standard deviation of the growth
rate of sales.
49Table VII: Financing constraints test: direct revelation criteria.
Regression:
lnli,t = π0 + ai + dt + π1 lnθi,t−1 + π2 lnki,t−1 + π3 lnni,t + π4 lnwF
i,t−1 + εi,t
1988-1991 sample
All All Dhs Dlc Dlc
−south Dlc
−s.&lowyield
(86-91) (88-91) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
lnki,t−1 0.30∗∗∗ 0.17∗ 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.18** 0.15 0.18** 0.16* 0.25**
(3.6) (1.9) (0.8) (0.5) (1.4) (2.0) (1.5) (1.9) (1.7) (2.3)
lnni,t 0.62∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.86*** 0.99*** 0.82*** 0.66*** 0.81*** 0.80*** 0.77*** 0.74***
(5.1) (4.8) (5.6) (6.3) (5.4) (4.6) (5.2) (4.6) (5.1) (5.3)
lnθi,t−1 1.94∗∗ 1.57∗ 1.56* 2.01* 1.80** 2.27*** 1.99** 2.43** 1.99** 2.72***
(2.0) (1.7) (1.6) (1.8) (2.0) (2.6) (2.1) (2.5) (2.1) (2.7)
lnwF
i,t−1 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.03
(0.4) (-0.5) (-1.5) (0.4) (-0.7) (0.1) (-0.6) (0.5) (-0.8) (0.7)
lnki,t−1*Di,t 0.17 0.10 0.29 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.25 0.14
(0.7) (0.5) (1.4) (1.0) (1.2) (1.0) (1.0) (0.7)
lnni,t ∗ Di,t -.49** -.63*** -.51*** -.26 -0.46** -0.43** -0.48** -0.37*
(-2.3) (-2.6) (-2.8) (-0.9) (-2.5) (-2.1) (-2.2) (-1.8)
lnθi,t−1 ∗ Di,t -1.34 -2.53 5.23 5.82 4.17 4.52 5.59 4.94
(-0.4) (-0.6) (0.9) (1.1) (0.7) (0.5) (0.8) (0.8)
lnwF
i,t−1 ∗ Di,t 0.33*** 0.24** 0.19* 0.15 0.19** 0.20** 0.20** 0.20**
(2.9) (1.9) (1.8) (1.4) (2.0) (2.0) (2.1) (2.4)
n. Obs. 1970 1335 1335 1366 1335 1366 1335 1366 1335 1366
F test 50 34 20 14 15 18 14 15 14 18
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Hansen test 122 61 115 126 113 103 112 114 112 104
(85) (57) (117) (117) (117) (117) (117) (117) (117) (117)
p-value 0.010 0.337 0.541 0.263 0.581 0.820 0.611 0.544 0.626 0.792
P - v a l u eo fH 0: π4 =0for the Di,t =1group
0.01 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.00
*S i g n i ﬁcant at the 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The coeﬃcients are estimated
with a two step robust System GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The t-statistic is reported in parentheses. The
ﬁnite-sample correction to the two-step covariance matrix is derived by Windmeijer (2005). We use the command Xtabond2 in
the software package Stata. The variables are described in appendix 5. The smallest 1% and largest 1% of the ﬁrst diﬀerences of
t h er e g r e s s o r sa n do ft h ed e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l ea r ee l i m i n a t e da so utliers. Year dummy variables are entered as strictly exogenous
regressors.
Instruments for the equation in levels are t-1 to t-3 ﬁrst diﬀerences of the regressors and t-2 to t-3 the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the
dependent variable. Instruments for the equation in ﬁrst diﬀerences are t-3 levels of the regressors and of the dependent variable.
T h eF .t e s tr e p o r t st h et e s to fj o i n ts i g n i ﬁcance of all estimated coeﬃcients. The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions
is reported. This test is robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of unknown form. In columns “(1)” ﬁnancial wealth
is deﬁned by equation (45). In columns “(2)” ﬁnancial wealth is deﬁned by equation (48). The p-value in the last row is the
probability to reject H0 when it is true.
50Table VIII: Structural parameters.
1986-91 sample 1988-91 sample
All ﬁrms All ﬁrms Dhs =1 Dlc
−s.&−lowyield =1
(2) (2)
b α 0.154 0.108 0.025 0.092
b γ 0.319 0.420 0.492 0.272
b β 0.484 0.363 0.502 0.632
e α 0.040 0.043
e γ 0.229 0.230
e β 0.629 0.629
The estimates b α, b γ and b β are derived from the corresponding columns
of table V, using the restrictions in equation (44). e γ =average of (labor
cost/output), e β=average of (materials cost/output), e α = average of
(user cost of ﬁxed capital/output). The user cost of ﬁxed capital is
computed by assuming that δ =0 .1.
51Table IX: Financing constraints test, direct and indirect criteria, 1986-91 sample.
Regression:




(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
lnki,t−1 0.33∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.36∗∗ 0.29∗∗
(3.4) (2.2) (3.3) (2.3) (3.1) (2.0)
lnni,t 0.59∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.29∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗
(4.7) (3.6) (2.4) (1.7) (2.6) (2.7)
lnθi,t−1 1.99∗ 2.12∗ 4.02∗∗∗ 4.50∗∗∗ 3.06∗∗∗ 3.27∗∗
(1.7) (1.6) (2.9) (2.6) (2.5) (2.4)
lnwF
i,t−1 0.01 -0.08 -0.01 -0.09 0.01 -0.03
(0.2) (-1.5) (-0.1) (-1.3) (0.2) (-0.6)
lnki,t−1*Di,t -0.49∗∗ -0.34∗ -0.21 -0.23 -0.27 -0.32
(-2.3) (-1.7) (-1.3) (-1.3) (-1.5) (-1.4)
lnni,t*Di,t 0.04 -0.09 0.36∗ 0.55∗∗ 0.01 -0.43
(0.2) (-0.5) (1.6) (2.5) (0.1) (-1.4)
lnθi,t−1*Di,t -0.62 0.56 -4.69∗∗ -4.88∗∗ -1.66 -1.47
(-0.2) (0.2) (-2.4) (-2.2) (-0.7) (-0.6)
lnwF
i,t−1*Di,t 0.32∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.09 0.29∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.26∗∗
(2.2) (3.5) (1.1) (1.7) (2.3) (2.1)
n. Obs. 1970 2017 1970 2017 1970 2017
F test 24 16 24 23 35 31
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Hansen t. 165 229 198 245 186 239
(175) (175) (175) (175) (175) (175)
p-value 0.687 0.004 0.105 0.000 0.269 0.001
P-value of H0: π4 =0f o rt h eDi,t = 1 group
0.02 0.002 0.15 0.21 0.01 0.040
*S i g n i ﬁcant at the 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The
coeﬃcients are estimated with a two step robust System GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond,
1998). The t-statistic is reported in parentheses. See the footnote to table VII for details.
52Table X: Financing constraints test: direct revelation criteria and the 1988-91 sample. Alterna-
tive deﬁnition of wealth.
Regression: lnli,t =
π0 + ai + dt + π1 lnθi,t−1 + π2 lnki,t−1 + π3 lnni,t + π4 ln e wF
i,t−1 + εi,t
Dhs Dlc Dage Ddivpol Dsize
lnki,t−1 -0.01 0.16 0.28∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.23∗
(-0.1) (1.4) (2.6) (1.9) (1.8)
lnni,t 1.06∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗
(6.4) (5.6) (4.6) (2.9) (4.9)
lnθi,t−1 1.27 1.48 0.77 3.23 3.03∗∗
(1.1) (1.2) (0.5) (1.5) (1.9)
ln e wF
i,t−1 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.05
(-0.8) (-1.3) (-1.6) (-1.4) (-1.5)
lnki,t−1*Di,t 0.37 0.21 -0.25∗ -0.07 -0.20
(1.4) (1.0) (-1.7) (-0.4) (-1.1)
lnni,t*Di,t -0.54∗∗ -0.25 0.11 0.11 -0.59∗
(-1.9) (-1.3) (0.8) (0.5) (-1.9)
lnθi,t−1*Di,t -2.83 4.32 1.92 -4.68 -6.64∗∗
(-0.5) (0.6) (0.7) (-1.6) (-2.0)
ln e wF
i,t−1*Di,t 0.18∗ 0.02 0.12 0.16∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(1.8) (0.2) (1.5) (1.8) (3.0)
n. Obs. 1115 1115 1628 1628 1628
F test 17 21 22 27 29
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Hansen test 114 99 193 237 215
(117) (117) (175) (175) (175)
p-value 0.545 0.878 0.159 0.001 0.021
*S i g n i ﬁcant at the 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
e wF
i,t it is equal to wF
i,t as deﬁn e di ne q u a t i o n( 4 5 )n e to fﬁnished goods inventories. The
coeﬃcients are estimated with a two step robust System GMM estimator (Blundell and
Bond, 1998). The t-statistic is reported in parentheses. See the footnote to table VII for
details.
53Table XI: Financing constraints test: estimation of the sample based on the 1998 and 2001
Surveys.
Regression:
lnli,t = π0 + ai + dt + π1 lnθi,t−1 + π2 lnki,t−1 + π3 lnni,t + π4 lnwF
i,t−1 + εi,t
Drationed Dpayhigher Dage Dsize
lnki,t−1 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.20***
(3.4) (4.4) (3.9) (4.6) (3.6) (4.1) (3.6) (4.0)
lnni,t 0.75*** 0.80*** 0.73*** 0.79*** 0.68*** 0.68*** 0.72*** 0.72***
(9.7) (10.9) (10.2) (11.0) (8.9) (9.5) (8.9) (8.9)
lnθi,t−1 1.40*** 1.43*** 1.45*** 1.26*** 1.60*** 1.51*** 1.47*** 1.26***
(3.6) (3.6) (3.6) (3.1) (4.0) (4.1) (4.0) (3.6)
lnwF
i,t−1 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05
(-1.4) (-1.5) (-0.3) (-1.2) (-0.9) (-1.1) (-0.6) (-1.4)
lnki,t−1*Di,t -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.12 -0.08 -0.01 0.00 0.03
(-0.8) (-0.8) (-0.4) (-0.6) (-0.9) (-0.1) (0.0) (0.3)
lnni,t ∗ Di,t -0.07 -0.11 -0.06 -0.15 0.06 -0.03 -0.34* -0.25**
(-0.6) (-0.7) (-0.3) (-0.7) (0.6) (-0.3) (-1.8) (-2.0)
lnθi,t−1 ∗ Di,t -1.22 -1.37* -0.81 -1.02 -1.89 -2.23** -0.82 -0.60
(-1.4) (-1.6) (-0.9) (-1.2) (-1.5) (-2.1) (-0.7) (-0.5)
lnwF
i,t−1 ∗ Di,t 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.14* 0.26*** 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.16**
(2.7) (2.8) (1.6) (2.8) (0.2) (0.7) (0.8) (2.5)
n. Obs. 4656 5266 4656 5266 4656 5266 4656 5266
F test 24 36 34 40 31 26 39 40
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
Hansen test 289 285 206 219 267 287 258 278
(254) (254) (254) (254) (254) (254) (254) (254)
p-value 0.089 0.086 0.988 0.945 0.248 0.076 0.411 0.141
P - v a l u eo fH 0: π4 =0for the Di,t =1group
0.019 0.019 0.123 0.015 0.750 0.076 0.497 0.044
*S i g n i ﬁcant at the 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at the 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The coeﬃcients are
estimated with a two step robust System GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The t-statistic is reported
in parentheses. See the footnote to table VII for details.
Table XII: Summary statistics of the variables used to estimate the production function.
Variable Mean St.Dev Min Max
yi,t 33.105 68.002 1.095 1162.078
li,t 19.582 51.121 0.093 1200.405
ni,t 11.303 19.475 0.343 235.296
ki,t 8.179 18.454 0.067 259.543
Values are in billions of Italian Lire, 1982 prices. 1 Billion lire was equal to
0.71 million US$ at the 1982 exchange rate. yi,t = total revenues; ki,t =
replacement value of the plant, equipment and other intangible ﬁxed assets;
li,t = usage of materials; ni,t = labor cost.
54Table XIII: Composition of the groups for which the production function is separately estimated.
Two Digits ISTAT* Sectors Number of ﬁrms
Group 1: Industrial Machinery 78
Group 2: Electronic Machinery, Precision Instruments 49
Group 3: Textiles, Shoes and Clothes, Wood Furniture 117
Group 4: Chemicals, Rubber and Plastics 63
Group 5: Metallic Products 80
Group 6: Food, Sugar and Tobaccos, Paper and Printing 66
Group 7: Non-metallic Minerals, Other Manufacturing 108
* Italian National Statistic Institute
Table XIV: Production function estimation results.
All Firms Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group6 Group 7
b α 0.111 0.105 0.062 0.114 0.081 0.038 0.040 0.198
(0.02) (0.02) (0.015) (0.03) (0.02) (0.022) (0.01) (0.02)
b β 0.389 0.377 0.289 0.424 0.454 0.393 0.562 0.406
(0.02) (0.01) (0.013) (0.03) (0.01) (0.017) (0.01) (0.024)
b γ 0.441 0.494 0.468 0.348 0.193 0.491 0.350 0.401
(0.03) (0.02) (0.023) (0.04) (0.01) (0.034) (0.01) (0.05)
Sargan T. 65.50 38.90 25.78 39.87 39.71 38.20 45.18 33.64
D.f. 37 37 27** 37 37 37 36* 36*
P-value 0.00 0.38 0.53 0.34 0.35 0.40 0.14 0.58
χ2*** 29.7 41.7 814.6 217.2 9.61 11.35 0.01
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.91
n. ﬁrms 561 78 49 117 63 80 66 108
n. obs. 4488 624 392 936 504 640 528 864
*O n ec o e ﬃcient relative to a two-digit sector dummy variable is estimated here. ** Only t − 1 instruments used for
the estimation of this group, due to the reduced number of observations. *** Wald test of the following restriction:
α + β + γ =1 . Standard deviations are in parentheses. b α = estimated elasticity of output to ﬁxed capital. b β =
estimated elasticity of output to variable capital. b γ = estimated elasticity of output to labor. Sargan test is a test of
the overidentifying restrictions.
55Table XV: Test of the validity of the instruments.
Regression: lnli,t =
π0 + ai + dt + π1 lnθi,t−1 + π2 lnki,t−1 + π3 lnni,t + π4 ln e wF
i,t−1 + εi,t




t - 2t ot - 3l e v e l s
as instruments
of the equation in
ﬁrst diﬀerences




Hansen J statistic (p-value) - cross sectional equations
1986 0.34 0.67
1987 0.46 0.03 0.87
1988 0.81 0.53 0.89
1989 0.51 0.58 0.66
1990 0.27 0.51 0.67
1991 0.93 0.03 0.11
First stage regressions statistics
lnki,t−1 : Shea0s partial R2 0.01 0.13 0.07
lnki,t−1 :Fs t a t .( p - v a l . ) 1 (0.60) 24 (0.000) 10 (0.000)
lnni,t : Shea0s partial R2 0.025 0.05 0.03
lnni,t :F s t a t .( p - v a l u e ) 1.1 (0.37) 10 (0.000) 5.4 (0.000)
lnwF
i,t : Shea0s partial R2 0.16 0.16 0.01
lnwF
i,t :F stat. (p-value) 5.2 (0.000) 20 (0.000) 2.3 (0.013)
lnθi,t :Shea0sp a r t .R2 0.44 0.31 0.05
lnθi,t :F stat. (p-val.) 60.4 (0.000) 44 (0.000) 12 (0.00)
1) We include the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the regressors and the t-2 and t-3 ﬁrst diﬀerences of the dependent variable.
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